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ABSTRACT
Over the last forty years Africa has been one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world,
resulting in untold human suffering. It has been estimated that between 1955 and 1999 some
nine to ten million people have died as a result of violent conflict in Africa. However, those
suffering the most in these wars are not merely the defenceless victims of conflict, but also its
active perpetrators. More than 120 000 children under the age of 18 years have been forced or
recruited to participate in armed conflicts across Africa. Although the use of children in armed
conflict is not a new phenomenon, it has never been as widespread and as brutal as during the
past decade.
Governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions, security
institutes and the media have conducted extensive research on the phenomenon of child
soldiers, specifically focusing on the demobilisation and reintegration of child combatants.
Surprisingly, not much research has been conducted on why particular states are more prone to
utilise these little soldiers than others.
This thesis attempts to fill that gap by analysing the circumstances under which children are
utilised as soldiers in Africa. This aim is divided into three subdivisions, namely to describe the
type of states in which children are utilised as soldiers, to analyse the conflicts in which child
soldiers are utilised, and to describe the socio-economic conditions that urge children to take up
arms.
An analysis of the child soldier-phenomenon suggests that it transpires in weak states. These
states exhibit very distinct characteristics, including serious problems of legitimacy, the absence
of one cohesive national identity, the presence of opposing local strongmen, high levels of
institutional weakness, economic underdevelopment, and a vulnerability to external international
forces. The weakness of these states is created by the fragmentation of social control amongst
various social organisations, which is in turn caused by the expansion of the world economy
from Europe and also by colonialism. This fragmentation poses immense challenges to state
leaders and forces them to adopt very distinct political policies, which put certain limitations on
the process of state-making.
In response to this, leaders have adopted a number of social, political and economic strategies.
These, together with the socio-economic conditions - specifically poverty - within weak states
often create civil violence. These strategies include political centralisation, authoritarianism,
ethnic politics, the manipulation of democratic processes and mechanisms, patronage politics
iii
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and the manipulation of state economic structures and policies. However, in order to
successfully execute these strategies, rulers need wealth-creating resources, which usually
result in the exploitation of scarce natural resources. Warlords and local strongmen also exploit
resources to purchase arms to combat both government forces and opposing strongmen. In
addition, large international private companies cash in on the financial advantages accrued from
conflict. This leads to the formation of entrenched war economies. In the end then, these wars
becomean excuse to plunder natural resources for private enrichment.
A very distinct characteristic of these conflicts is the widespread use of child soldiers. All the
armed groups in Africa's wars, including government armed forces, paramilitary groups and
armed opposition groups, are to a greater or lesser extent guilty of recruiting, forcefully
conscripting, press-ganging and deploying child soldiers.
However, states that utilise child soldiers all exhibit similar socio-economic characteristics.
Poverty is endemic. Famine is widespread and magnifies the problems caused by war and
poverty even further. The provision of medical and health care is insufficient because of the
vast number of war wounded and the destruction of hospitals and clinics. This is also
aggravated by the high numbers of HIV/AIDS sufferers. Schools are destroyed, educational
systems are often poorly developed and illiteracy is widespread. In addition, due to years of
war and civil unrest, millions of people are displaced and forced to become refugees. These
socio-economic characteristics create the ideal breeding ground for the recruitment of child
soldiers.
iv
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vOPSOMMING
Oor die afgelope veertig jaar was Afrika een van die mees konflikgedrewe streke in die wêreld
wat op onbeskryflike menslike lyding uitgeloop het. Dit is bereken dat tussen 1955 en 1999
ongeveer nege tot tien miljoen persone gesterf het as gevolg van die gewelddadige konflikte in
Afrika. Maar diegene wat die meeste in sulke oorloë gely het, was nie maar net die weerlose
slagoffers van die konflik nie, maar hulle was inderdaad ook aktiewe deelnemers daaraan. Meer
as 120 000 kinders onder die ouderdom van 18 jaar is gedwing of gewerf om aan gewapende
konflik regoor Afrika deel te neem. Alhoewel die deelname van kinders aan gewapende konflik
nie 'n nuwe verskynsel is nie, was dit nog nooit so wydverspreid en so brutaal soos tydens die
afgelope dekade nie.
Regeringsorganisasies, nie-regeringsorganisasies, akademiese instellings, sekerheids-
instellings en die media het uitgebreide navorsing onderneem oor die verskynsel van
kindersoldate, en spesifiek gefokus op die demobilisering en herintegrasie van kinderkrygers.
Verbasend genoeg is nie veel navorsing gedoen oor waarom spesifieke state meer gereed
staan om hierdie klein soldaatjies aan te wend as andere nie.
Hierdie tesis poog om hierdie kennisgaping te vul deur die omstandighede waaronder kinders
as soldate in Afrika aangewendword, te analiseer. Die doel hiermee word in drie onderafdelings
verdeel, naamlik om die tipes state te beskryf waarin kinders as soldate aangewend word, om
die konflikte te analiseer waarin kindersoldate gebruik word en ook om die sosio-ekonomiese
omstandighede te beskryf wat kinders aanspoor om die wapen op te neem.
'n Analise van die kindersoldaatverskynsel dui aan dat dit in swak state voorkom. Hierdie state
openbaar besonderse kenmerke, insluitende ernstige probleme rakende legitimiteit, die
afwesigheid van 'n enkele samebindende nasionale identiteit, die aanwesigheid van plaaslike
sterk leiers, hoë vlakke van institusionele swakhede, ekonomiese onderontwikkeling en In
blootstelling aan eksterne internasionale kragte. Die swakhede van hierdie state het ontstaan
deur die fragmentering van sosiale beheer onder verskeie sosiale organisasies, wat op hul
beurt veroorsaak is deur die uitbreiding van die wêreldekonomie vanuit Europa en ook deur
kolonialisme. Hierdie fragmentering gee aanleiding tot ontsaglike uitdagings vir staatsleiers en
dwing hulle om onderskeidende politieke beleidsrigtings toe te pas wat weer sekere beperkings
op die proses van staatsvorming plaas.
In antwoord hierop het leiers 'n aantal sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese strategieë aanvaar.
Tesame met die sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede - en spesifiek armoede - skep hierdie
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strategieë dikwels burgerlike geweld binne swak state. Sulke strategieë sluit in politieke
sentralisasie, outoritêre oorheersing, etniese beleidsrigtings, die manipulering van demokratiese
prosesse en meganismes, die politiek van beskerming en begunstiging, asook die manipulering
van die staat se ekonomiese strukture en beleidsrigtings. Maar om hierdie strategieë suksesvol
uit te voer, benodig die heersers welvaartskeppende hulpbronne wat gewoonlik uitloop op die
uitbuiting van skaars natuurlike hulpbronne. Gewapende aanvoerders en plaaslike
onderdrukkers plunder ook hulpbronne om wapens aan te skaf om sowel regeringsmagte asook
opponerende onderdrukkers te beveg. Daarby trek internasionale private maatskappye ook
voordeel uit die finansiële opbrengste wat uit konflik verkry word. Dit alles lei tot die
totstandkoming van verskanste oorlogsekonomieë. In die finale analise word hierdie oorloë
bloot 'n verskoning om natuurlike hulpbronne vir eie verryking te plunder.
'n Baie onderskeidende kenmerk van hierdie konflikte is die wydverspreide aanwending van
kindersoldate. AI die gewapende groepe in Afrika se oorloë, insluitende regerings se
gewapende magte, paramilitêre groepe en gewapende opposisiegroepe, is almal tot mindere of
meerdere mate skuldig aan die werwing, gewelddadige rekrutering en aanwending en ook die
ontplooiing van kindersoldate.
State wat kindersoldate gebruik, toon almal soortgelyke sosio-ekonomiese kenmerke. Armoede
is endemies. Hongersnood is wydverspreid en vererger die probleme wat deur oorloë en
armoede veroorsaak is. Die voorsiening van mediese- en gesondheidsorg is onvoldoende as
gevolg van die hoë aantal HIVNigslyers. Skole is vernietig, onderwysstelsels is dikwels
onderontwikkeld en ongeletterdheid is wydverspreid. As gevolg van jare se oorloë en burgerlike
onrus word miljoene mense verder ook uit hul huise gedryf en gedwing om vlugtelinge te word.
Hierdie sosio-ekonomiese kenmerke skep die ideale teelaarde vir die werwing van
kindersoldate.
vi
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WEAK STATES AND CHILD SOLDIERING IN AFRICA: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Over the last 40 years Africa has been one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world,
resulting in untold human suffering. Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought on the
continent. In 1992 Africa was declared the most violent continent in the world, and in 1993 11
of the 26 major conflicts in the world were fought in Africa (Sesay et aI, 2000: 44). In 1996
alone, 14 of the 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflict, accounting for more than half of
all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than eight million refugees, returnees
and displaced persons (Global Issues, 2001b). It has been estimated that from 1955 to 1999
between nine and ten million people died on the continent as a result of violent conflict. Of 48
recorded genocides in the world, 20 occurred in Africa.
A general characteristic of these conflicts is the large-scale use and abuse of children recruited
as so-called "child soldiers". Although the use of children in armed conflict is not a new
phenomenon, it has never been as widespread and as brutal as during the past decade
(Stavrou et aI, 2000: 35; Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994: 23). In the past, the size and weight of
weaponry limited children to supportive roles, but arms technology is presently so advanced
that children are able to comfortably operate weapons such as the M16 and AK47 assault rifles.
This means that an increased number of children could be more useful in battle with less
training than ever before - a factor that makes them very attractive as recruits (United Nation
Children's Fund, 1996a).
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2001b) estimates that more than 120 000
children under the age of 18 years have been forced or recruited to participate in armed
conflicts across Africa, some of them as young as seven years of age. An example of the
exploitation of child soldiers as a common practice, occurred in Angola's civil war. It has been
estimated that between 1980 and 1988, every third child in the country had been involved in
some military aspect of the civil war (Taylor, 2001). After the resumption of armed conflict in
1998, reportedly some 7 000 child soldiers were recruited to participate in the conflict.
According to Penrose (2001: 10) "Angola is now well known as the worst place in the world to
be a child." Similarly, there are more than 10 000 child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
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the Congo (DRC). In 2001, the United Nations (UN) estimated that 15 to 30 percent of newly
recruited combatants were children under the age of 18 and a substantial number were under
the age of 12 (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001 b).
An estimated number of 14 000 children have taken part in the civil war in Burundi, and the
proliferation of military schools throughout the country, known as "training centres," has
increased youth recruitment. In Rwanda, thousands of youths actively participated in the 1994
genocide, and the latest figures indicate that an estimated 20 000 children are currently active
soldiers.
Despite claims by the armed forces of Liberia that children under the age of 18 are not recruited
for military service, evidence indicates that all the warring factions have recruited large numbers
of underage children. In Charles Taylor's days as warlord, his "Small Boy Unit" was renowned
for its extraordinary bravery in the face of odds that would daunt the more cautious (Catholic
World News, 1996; Hope for the Nations, 2002). During Sierra Leone's 10-year civil war some
5 000 child soldiers served among government and opposition forces and a further 5 000 were
recruited to labour among armed groups. These forces usually relied on forced recruitment
through abduction and drug use, and were responsible for exceptionally cruel and degrading
treatment of children (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001a).
Thousands of children were used in the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Minors were
specifically used on the front line to clear minefields for the regular army. In Uganda, the Lord's
Resistance Army's (LRA) deliberate and systematic abduction of thousands of children is
annihilating an entire generation (Amnesty International, 1997). This trend is also evident in
Somalia and the Sudan (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001 b). However, reliable
data and documentation are scarce and most armed groups, including government forces, deny
the recruitment of children. Consequently, the exact number of child soldiers cannot be
assessed and, therefore, they remain "invisible" (Twum-Danso, 2003: 12).
Most of these children are recruited or abducted from their homes and families at a very young
. age and subjected to a regime of extreme and arbitrary violence. Under the influence of alcohol
and drugs, they loot, murder, amputate limbs, rape, and often kill and mutilate members of their
own families and communities so that they have nowhere to return to. Those caught trying to
escape are killed or tortured by their own friends - both boys and girls are brutalised by being
made to kill other children. Girls are raped, forced into marriages and held as sexual slaves.
These children are used as cannon fodder, marched over minefields to clear the way for armed
forces and forced to fight in the front lines.
2
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Governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academic institutions,
security institutes, and the media have conducted some research on the phenomenon of child
soldiers. Although this research covers various aspects related to child soldiering, its main
focus is the demobilisation and reintegration of child combatants. Various procedures were
identified to care for unaccompanied children, to heal the mental wounds of war, to embark on
education for peace, and, ultimately, to stop the use of children as soldiers (Mausse, 1998: 10-
13; Sesay et ai, 2000: 55-60). International role players are also pressuring armed forces to
stop this repulsive practice. Treaties governing the use of child soldiers include the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989), the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child (United Nations, 2002), the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977), and, in Africa, the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Organisation of African Unity,
1991).
However, although this research and treaties cover a large spectrum of the problem of child
soldiering, they merely address the symptoms, and often fail to adequately address the origins
of the problem. The pressing question is: what are the characteristics of the African State in
which the phenomenon of child soldiering occurs? Also, what kind of state permits and
contributes to the use of child soldiers? The author believes that the inherent characteristics of
these states provide a breeding ground for the recruitment and utilisation of child soldiers.
Governments, NGOs, academics, aid organisations and psychologists would not be able to
salvage the plight of child soldiers if they fail to identify and address these characteristics.
1.2 AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The study commences with the identification of a significant problem plaguing the African
continent, namely child soldiering. It poses the important question: what are the characteristics
of the African state in which the phenomenon of child soldiering occurs? This question focuses
the aim of the study, namely to analyse the circumstances under which children are utilised as
soldiers in Africa. The aim could in turn be divided into three subdivisions: firstly, to describe
the type of states in which children are utilised as soldiers; secondly, to analyse the conflicts in
which child soldiers are utilised; and thirdly, to describe the socio-economic conditions that
impel children to take up arms.
In Chapter 2, the focus is placed on the framework of the weak state theory developed by,
amongst others, Migdal (1988), Reno (1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001) and Jackson (2000,
3
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2002). The status of the African states under discussion is measured against Jackson and
Rosberg's (1984) empirical and juridical criteria and the differences between strong and weak
states are indicated.
The identification and discussion of the characteristics of weak states are followed by an
examination of the impact that the expansion of the world economy and colonialism had on the
social structures within African states and the manner in which they altered the distribution of
social control in their different societies. The focus is aimed at the fragmentation of social
control, the consequent dilemma threatening the political survival of weak state leaders and the
limitations this place on the state-making process in African states. Aspects such as the nature
of the state that African rulers inherited at independence, the delayed establishment of
institutions of democratic politics by colonial powers, the exclusion of Africans from the political
sphere, and Cold War patronage are also discussed. Chapter 2 concludes with the notion that
the African states in which child soldiers are utilised are characterised by weak political systems
and governments.
Whereas the strategies weak state rulers employ to overcome the obstacles are discussed in
Chapter 2, the socio-economic conditions inside weak states, and the consequent conflict they
create, is the focus of Chapter 3. This chapter identifies the different role players involved in
these conflicts and examines the relevant political, social and economic causes. It indicates
that conflict is either an unintentional consequence of weak state rulers' strategies to maintain
power, or it is the direct result of deliberate strategies designed to accumulate wealth. It also
suggests a connection between poverty, weak state politics, and war economies, as both rulers
and rebels need scarce resources in order to support and sustain their war efforts. In these
wars, resources become the rewards for controlling the state.
Chapter 4 offers a perspective on the problem of child soldiering as a characteristic of Africa's
conflicts, and identifies and discusses some salient factors that exacerbate conflict and, more
importantly, create the conditions under which children take up arms.
This chapter argues that government and rebel forces forcibly recruit or abduct children as a
result of a shortage of manpower and because they are easier to recruit and retain than adults.
These children are subjected to varying degrees of intimidation through processes that use fear,
drugs, brutality and psychological manipulation to achieve high levels of obedience, ultimately
converting them into killers. They perform a whole range of domestic and military activities and
are also often victims of sexual abuse.
4
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Furthermore, it is indicated that widespread poverty and famine are prevalent in all the states
utilising child soldiers. Inadequate educational systems and infrastructure entail children often
being illiterate and unable to be employed. Elsewhere, poor medical systems and the spread of
HIV/AIDS leave thousands of children orphaned and responsible for their own livelihood.
Because of conflict millions of people are refugees or displaced. Such unfavourable socio-
economic conditions render children extremely vulnerable and often drive them to become
soldiers, as it is often their sole means of survival.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
It is an assumption of this thesis that a correlation exists between the inherent characteristics of
certain African states, and the use of child soldiers. It is thus imperative to identify these
characteristics and, in doing so, to test the assumption of the thesis.
In light of this assumption, the study adopts as focus of analysis the "weak state" theory
developed by, amongst others, Migdal (1988), Henderson and Singer (2000), Reno (1998) and
Jackson (2001). This theory indicates that conflicts are exacerbated by a particular form of
politics, which is embedded in the structures of weak states and the actions of weak state rulers
(Migdal, 1988). Hence, according to Jackson (2001), "state processes - state construction or
adaptation, ruling class formation and consolidation, patrimonial ism and alliance creation - lie at
the heart of internal conflict." From this perspective, conflict is an inevitable occurrence in weak
state politics.
This framework forms the basis of the study, shedding light on the occurrence of conflict in
specific African states. An important characteristic and consequence of these conflicts is the
usage of children as soldiers. In addition, the unfavourable socia-economic factors prevalent in
weak states not only exacerbate the conflict, but also urge children to become soldiers, as it is
their only chance of survival.
This study is qualitative in its approach. The propositions are in the form of themes, motifs and
generalisations, and data are in the form of words and phrases from documents, observations
and transcripts. Analysis proceeds by extracting themes or generalisations from evidence and
organising data to present a coherent, consistent picture.
The study is also comparative, descriptive and exploratory in nature. It is comparative, as it
draws comparisons between the different states utilising child soldiers and it is descriptive in as
much as it presents a picture of the specific details of the problem of child soldiering in Africa.
5
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However, it is mainly exploratory, as it endeavours to identify the characteristics of African
states and their influence on the utilisation of child soldiers.
The universe of cases that is used in this study includes Angola, the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda,
Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. These specific states were
selected for two reasons. Firstly, they are the only states in which child soldiering is currently
practised or has until very recently been practised. Secondly, internal conflict is evident in these
states, or has until very recently been evident. The only state that has made extensive use of
child soldiers, but which is not included in this study is Mozambique, as its war ended in the
early 1990s, and is thus not relevant to this study. The unit of analysis is the African State, and
micro-level events are analysed in order to provide a macro-level explanation.
Research done by various governmental organisations and NGO's on the usage of child
soldiers will be studied in order to establish a firm foundation from which to analyse the
problem. Literature and data on African states will also be scrutinised to identify the various
characteristics of these states. Considering that the study will also focus on development
factors like poverty, hunger, per capita income, life expectancy etc., data from the United
Nation's Human Development Index (HOI) will be an important source to analyse and correlate.
Additional data will be extracted from Internet sources, published articles and papers delivered
at conferences. Primary fieldwork is not included.
Many factors will affect the availability, comparability and reliability of the data used in this
study. Statistical systems in many African states are weak, and statistical methods, coverage,
practices and definitions differ widely. For these reasons, although the data will be drawn from
the sources deemed to be the most authoritative, and verified with other sources, they should
be interpreted only as indicating similar socio-political characteristics among states rather than
offering precise quantitative measures of those characteristics.
1.4 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
The most important concepts, which will frequently be used throughout this thesis, are the
concepts state, weak state, conflict and child so/dier. Other important terms will be defined as
they emerge throughout the discussion.
6
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1.4.1 State and Weak State
International relations theory defines the concept state (as it is traditionally understood) in terms
of five features. It is sovereign and has supreme power over all other associations,
organisations, and groups; it is legitimate and recognised under international law as the
fundamental decision-making unit in the international legal system; it is public in terms of its
responsibility to make and administer collective laws, rules and decisions in the interest of the
public or for common good; it is an instrument of domination and has the power and the
capacity to enforce laws and punish transgressors; and it is geographically bounded to a
speciflc territory and includes all the inhabitants of the territory, regardless of their citizenship
status. Migdal (1988: 4) elaborates, stating that states have the capacity to "penetrate society,
regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined
ways." He also indicates that this is not the case with all states, but that "strong states are
those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on the low end of a
spectrum of capabilities." If one measures the African state in terms of its capabilities to
complete the tasks identified by Migdal, one notices that a sizeable number of African states
tend to fall into the lower end of the spectrum.
Recent and current post-Cold War studies increasingly focus on the weak state phenomena,
which are also occasionally referred to as "soft", "vampire", "failed", "shadow" or "collapsed"
states (Reno, 1998; Reno, 2000b) and as state "dissolution" and "disembowelment" (Zolberg,
1992; Zartman, 1995; Kaplan, 1994). Although there are some minor differences between
these various terms, they all refer in essence to the relationship between politics and corruption
(Reno,2000b). Since Migdal's theory is used as the frame of reference for this study, the term
he uses, namely "weak states", will be the standard phrase used throughout this discussion.
According to Migdal (1988: 261) "the starting point for analysis [of the weak state] is the
environment of conflict." This environment of conflict exists between the ruling elite of the weak
state and so-called strongmen, who co-exist in a fragmented society and consequently cause
the fragmentation of social control. In other words, "there is a struggle between state leaders,
who seek to mobilise people and resources and impose a single set of rules, and other social
organisations applying different rules in parts of the society." This opposition seriously restricts
state leaders' actions, as any serious effort to increase their capabilities would automatically
undermine the social control of the strongmen. However, state leaders' positions depend on the
strongmen's ability to ensure social stability, which they achieve through direct access to most
of the population and their ability to mobilise the population for a specific purpose. This implies
that state leaders do not have the ability to enforce social policy down to the level of the
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
individual and they thus have to employ strategies of "accommodation and persuasion" to obtain
the cooperation of strongmen. This, in tum, leads to the exploitation of patronage systems, as
especially funds find their way into the hands of strongmen.
Hence state leaders find themselves in the horns of a dilemma: if the leader builds strong state
agencies in order to promote political mobilisation, he would simultaneously build a potential
opposition. This is also the case when a leader concentrates coercive capabilities, employed to
suppress destabilising factions, amongst a small group of security agencies. The agencies
develop their own perspectives and come to pose a threat to the leader based on the means at
their disposal. An effective counterweight a leader could use against threatening security forces
is mobilising the relevant agencies. However, because of fragmented social control, the danger
of a military takeover is acute. This has led in some instances to the formation of paramilitary
forces falling directly under the control of the state leader. Another option open to a leader is to
dispense with major institution building and to deliberately sabotage his own bureaucracies,
distributing state offices to local allies to deny them to potential rivals as power bases. This is
called a "policy of preemption" and is achieved through the "politics of survival" including
strategies like the "big shuffle", "non-merit appointments" and "dirty tricks". However, a leader
has to be very careful to restrain state agencies sufficiently so as not to pose a threat to himself,
while allowing adequate organisation so that agencies could perform the tasks necessary for
the state and leader to survive. In the end then leaders are more often concerned with
defensive survival strategies than they are with building up the political institutions that would
ensure and solidify a strong state.
Reno (1998: 1) agrees with Migdal's theory that weak state rulers find themselves in a dilemma,
stating that rulers of weak states "reject the pursuit of a broader project of creating a state that
serves a collective good or even of creating institutions that are capable of developing
independent perspectives and acting on behalf of interests distinct from the rulers' personal
exercise of power." This means that, although weak state rulers face severe threats from
strongmen and intense pressure from external forces to reform, they nevertheless continue to
consistently destroy formal state institutions.
Furthermore, rulers also reject economic development when the probability exists that it may
put resources into the pockets or within reach of potential rivals. As a consequence, a wide
variety of economic roles are contracted to outsiders in order to impede the access to resources
by internal rivals and to utilise the skills and connections of outsiders to harvest as much wealth
as possible. This wealth is frequently converted into political resources, used as patronage to
buy the loyalty of some, or used to buy weapons to coerce others. In addition, due to the
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absence of effective bureaucratic state institutions, outsiders also fulfil political roles, for
instance those relating to state security. This gives rise to the creation of very strong patronage
systems centred on rulers' control over resources.
Consequently, the term of "weak state", as defined by Reno (1998: 2), "signifies a spectrum of
conventional bureaucratic state capabilities that exists alongside (generally very strong) informal
political networks." Furthermore, according to Jackson (2002) weak states display a variety of
distinct characteristics, which are classified as follows:
• the broader population do not perceive weak states as legitimate and either refuse to
participate in politics, or try to overthrow the government;
• there is no strong, cohesive national identity;
• rulers are threatened by local strongmen and the social control they exert;
• bureaucratic institutions are weak and in some instances non-existent, unable to
effectively implement state policies and render services;
• economic scarcity, underdevelopment and dependence are evident;
• states are vulnerable to the intrusion of international actors and forces; and
• children are often employed as soldiers.
Agreeing with Migdal and Reno, Jackson is of the opinion that these weaknesses may be
inherited from colonialism, but the blame could equally be placed on the Cold War superpowers
and their patronage systems. This gives rise to the adoption of certain survival strategies
pursued by weak state rulers who find themselves caught up in the dilemma described by
Migdal. The most controversial strategy is patronage politics, where rulers typically use state
resources to buy the support, loyalty and compliance of dominant groups in society, or favouring
business associates by racketeering. Rulers also manipulate state economic structures and
policies to the benefit of privileged groups and to control and discipline rivals. In addition, rulers
also employ exclusive politics, political centralisation and authoritarianism in order to exclude
certain factions of the population from participating in politics. Closely related to the above is
the strategy of ethnic politics, which exclude certain ethnic groups from the political processes.
Finally, rulers manipulate the democratic processes in their states to manage their structural
weaknesses. These strategies create an extremely volatile environment in which a strong
rivalry for control over the state and its institutions and resources take place. This inevitably
creates an environment of conflict.
Hence one has to agree with Ayoob (1992: 64) that "state-making, the political variable of
primary concern to political elites and decision-makers in Third World countries, must form the
centrepiece of any paradigm we attempt to construct for the explanation of internal and external
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behaviour of Third World States." In other words, conflict in Africa is the "direct result of a
particular form of politics that is rooted in the structures and processes of weak states"
(Jackson,2001).
1.4.2 Conflict
According to Mary Kaldor (1999: 2) a "new" type of conflict has materialised since the 1980s
and early 1990s, which is characterised by a mixture of war, organised crime and massive
human rights violations. Searching to define this new type of conflict she compares it with the
"old wars" of the Clausewitzian school of thought. "Old wars" were conducted between strong
states, which had effective monopoly of violence within their territories. There was a definite
distinction between public vs. private, military vs. civil and war vs. peace. Soldiers were
professionally trained under the supervision of the state and wore uniforms that distinguished
them from civilians. Combat rules stipulated the relationship between officers and soldiers, the
treatment of the wounded and prisoners of war and the protection of non-combatants.
On the other hand" new wars" are a paradox in every respect. States are weak, state power
has disintegrated and their monopoly of violence has dissolved. There is no separation
between public and private, military and civil and war and peace. Professional armies have
disintegrated and been replaced by private security forces, civilian militias and bandit gangs
who recruit child soldiers. Armed men no longer wear uniform and civilians are no longer
protected by rules of combat. The main sphere of violence is no longer the typical conventional
battlefield, but rather the village or the town centre. In this new environment civilians suffer the
most, as 90 percent of the victims are non-combatants - predominantly women and children
(Twum-Danso, 2003: 11). Furthermore, these conflicts have a tendency to be protracted with
continuous escalations and de-escalations, causing the prolonging of violence and instability. A
variety of terms are associated with these conflicts, for example small wars, limited wars,
resource wars, post-modern wars and security predicaments. For the purpose of this study the
term conflict will be used to include all the different types of conflict that are currently being
fought in Africa.
A document published by the British Ministry of International Development (2001: 8-9), titled
"The Causes of Conflict in Africa," divides African conflicts, according to their characteristics,
into four categories. The first type is conventional warfare, which is fought with regular troops,
along a defined series of fronts, utilising expensive technology such as heavy artillery and jet
fighters. Targets are primarily military and strategic in nature. The conflict between Ethiopia
and Eritrea was the only conventionally fought war in Africa during the last decade, while the
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conflict in Angola could be classified as semi-conventional. According to a document published
by Southern Links (2001), called "War and Conflict in Africa: A Bird's-Eye View", the scale of
military engagements during the final stages of the Eritrean war could have been compared to
some of the battles of the Second World War's North African campaign.
The second type, namely low-intensity guerrilla-style warfare - also referred to as factional
warfare - is more fluid by nature, has no defined front line, and is low tech, mainly utilising small
arms. This type of warfare is not too expensive and could be sustained without external aid.
These conflicts usually proceed rapidly from the original cause to revolve around the
exploitation of resources. An important aspect of this type of conflict is that it is usually the
preferred choice of warfare of warlords. A warlord is a "leader of an armed band ... who can
hold territory locally and ... act financially and politically in the international system without
interference from the state in which he is based" (Mackinlay, 2000). Warlords are typically
encountered in weak states where they challenge governments, pillage natural resources,
dislocate and annihilate uncooperative communities and obstruct international relief and peace
programmes. Warlords are not interested in capturing the state, but rather in the resources of
the state.
The third type is genocide and ethnically based conflict. The distinguishing characteristic of this
type of conflict is the rapidity with which genocidal attacks occur and the high degree of central
organisation and planning involved. Although ethnic and genocidal fighting tends to be
extremely low-tech using knives, machetes and small arms, it gives rise to a huge death toll,
massive displacement, fear and confusion. A case in point is Rwanda's 1994 genocide and the
ongoing genocide in Burundi.
Fourthly, the trend towards regional conflict continues. A large part of Africa, from the Sudan to
Angola, including the Great Lakes and the DRC, is embroiled in a series of conflicts. The war in
the DRC involves eight countries, while the DRC has sought to take the war back into Rwanda,
Burundi and Uganda. The war in Sierra Leone has acquired a similar regional dimension, as
has Angola's prolonged conflict, while the conflict in the Sudan has also maintained its strong
regional dimension. Altogether, 14 African countries are currently engaged in these four
regional conflicts (Jackson, 2002: 29; British Ministry of International Development, 2001: 8-9).
The protagonists in these conflicts include both internal and external actors. The internal actors
are government armies, armed insurgent groups, warlords, informally organised militias, drug
cartels and criminal gangs. External actors include international capitalists and mercantilists,
private military companies, humanitarian agencies and peacekeepers.
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The objectives of these internal and external actors include traditional ideological and political
goals, "chauvinistic ethno-nationalist" goals and, most importantly, economic goals. Whilst
pursuing their objectives, these protagonists employ a variety of strategies, particularly human
rights violations against civilian populations, for example ethnic cleansing, genocide, rape,
mutilation and the use of child soldiers (Jackson, 2001).
1.4.3 Child Soldier
In order to define the term child soldier, it is firstly necessary to determine what constitutes a
soldier. The Military Dictionary (South African Defence Force, 1983: 335) defines it as a warrior
who draws military pay. The Oxford Colour Dictionary (Stevenson et ai, 2001: 669) states that it
is "a person who serves in an army", and the Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary
(Reader's Digest Association, 1979) adds that it is a "man of military skill and experience." To
clarify this term further, the Geneva Conventions (International Committee of the Red Cross,
1949) declare the following:
"The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: to be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; to have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognisable at a distance; to carry arms openly; and to conduct their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war."
When measuring child soldiers against these criteria, one finds that they seldom comply with
them. Thus it could be deduced that they are not soldiers in the true sense of the word.
Therefore, it would in actual fact be incorrect to use the term "soldier" when referring to children
who participate in conflict. Consequently, it is necessary to find a more applicable concept.
However, a discussion on the most applicable alternative for the concept "soldier" is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Consequently the term "child soldier", as it is understood and used
internationally, despite its inherent inaccuracy, would nevertheless be used throughout this
thesis.
The definition of child soldiers used in this study is formulated in the Cape Town Principles
(Save the Children Sweden, 1997: 1), the result of an UNICEF symposium that was held in
Cape Town in April 1997. It states that the concept child soldier refers to:
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'~ny person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular
armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters,
messengers and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family
members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It
does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms. "
It is important to note that national armed forces as well as rebel groups are guilty of actively
recruiting children. Such armed forces include the Angolan Armed Forces (FM), the Burundian
Armed Forces, the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the Ethiopian Army, the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFl), the Rwandan Armed Forces, government allied forces in Sierra leone, and the
Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPOF). Rebel groups include the Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA), Hutu opposition groups, the Movement for the Liberation of
the Congo (MlC), and the Congolese Rally for Democracy Liberation Movement (RCD-Ml) in
the DRC, the Oromo Liberation Front (OlF) in Ethiopia, the Interahamwe in Rwanda, the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra leone, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
and the lord's Resistance Army (lRA) in Uganda (Child Soldiers Global Report, 2001). These
rebel groups do not only include insurgent groups, but also warlord networks led by warlords
like Sierra leone's Foday Sankoh, former leader of the RUF, Liberia's Charles Taylor before his
election as President in 1997, and Somalia's Farah Aideed.
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CHAPTER2
THE WEAK STATE IN AFRICA
2.1 BACKGROUND
The deployment of children in times of war is a widespread and far-reaching problem.
However, the investigation of the phenomenon of child soldiering in Africa leads one to the
discovery that it does not occur in all African states, but only in very specific ones. When
examining these states, identified as Angola, the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the Sudan,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, one finds the following common characteristics:
• they are often undemocratic in nature;
• governments are dysfunctional;
• election processes are exploited or flawed;
• there is insufficient accountability of leaders;
• governments lack transparency;
• checks and balances are inadequate;
• there is no adherence to the rule of law;
• peaceful means to change or replace leadership are absent; and
• human rights are not respected.
These also happen to be Africa's most politically and economically unstable states. They lack
the capacity to govern; hence they are also called "weak". As stated in Chapterf , Jackson
(2001) suggests that the prevalence of conflict in Africa is the direct result of the structures and
processes of weak states. Thus, in order to understand Africa's conflicts, one first has to
examine the features of Africa's weak states.
2.2 DEFINING AFRICA'S WEAK STATES
In Chapter 1, the concept "state" was defined in terms of international relations and the following
characteristics were identified: it is a sovereign entity with supreme power; it is legitimate and
recognised under international law as the fundamental decision-making unit; it is public in terms
of its responsibility to make and administer collective laws in the interest of the public or for
.cornrnon good; it is an instrument of domination and has the power and the capacity to enforce
laws; and it is geographically bounded to a specific territory and includes all the inhabitants of
that territory.
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Jackson and Rosberg (1984) divide these characteristics into empirical and juridical criteria
respectively. Empirical criteria refer to a government's monopoly on force, and the presence of
a definite population, territory and boundaries. Juridical criteria refer to the state's sovereignty
in the international arena, implying that a state has internal sovereignty, and that no external
role players have the right or the power to interfere in the internal affairs of another state.
According to Jackson and Rosberg's framework, many African states exist more in juridical
terms than in empirical terms. Evidence to support this statement is ample: states are
confronted with disputes over citizenship since separatist groups attract more loyalty than the
state, as is the case with the Oromo and Tigreans in Ethiopia; borders are fluid and
controversial, for example in Ethiopia and Eritrea; governments do not have a monopoly of force
and are often threatened by armed opposition groups, such as in Uganda, Sierra Leone, the
DRC, Burundi and Rwanda; and foreign debt, including being in arrears to the international
financial institutions and developed countries, severely restricts their capability to operate as
sovereign states (Osaghae, 1999: 184). This framework thus supports the theory that a
sizeable number of African states are weak.(Migdal, 1988; Reno, 1998; Jackson, 2001).
According to Jackson (2002: 38) it is possible to distinguish between strong and weak states
using a matrix of social, political and economic factors. In essence, strong states are successful
at state-making. Ayoob (1996: 38) suggests that this process includes three aspects, namely
war, policing and taxation. Thus - as indicated in Chapter 1 - strong states have the capacity
to "penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use
resources in determined ways" (Migdal, 1988: 4). To be more specific, this refers to the
willingness and capability of a state to uphold social control, ensure civil adherence to official
laws, render basic services, develop effective policies, safeguard stability and cohesion,
encourage civil participation in state institutions, regulate and direct the national economy, act
decisively, and preserve legitimacy. "Strong states also possess high levels of socio-political
cohesion that is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies, strong national
identities and productive and highly developed economies" (Jackson, 2002: 38).
Weak states, on the other hand, have very distinct features that distinguish them from strong
states. Firstly, they face serious problems of legitimacy characterised by unconsolidated or
non-existent democracies, inconclusive or stage-managed elections, a lack of national support
for government, very low political participation rates, high levels of disengagement by important
sections of the population, the utilisation of coercion to ensure compliance, unstable politics
involving riots, rebellions, plots and coups, and severe social divisions along ethnic and
religious lines. This lack of legitimacy forces the centralisation of power in a ruling elite, who
often creates elaborate patronage systems to ensure political control (for example, over scarce
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and valuable resources) in an unstable environment (Jackson, 2002: 39). The inability of the
state to distribute resources equally and fairly as a public good, exacerbates the problem of
legitimacy, as the members of the excluded groups are not loyal to the government and are
often prompted to oppose or challenge the state (Osaghae, 1999: 191).
Secondly, weak states suffer from a lack of cohesive national identity. According to Jackson
(2002: 39) this dates back to their emergence into juridical statehood. The typical African state
introduced by the colonial powers was a foreign concept forced onto an arbitrarily defined
territorial unit. On becoming independent, these territories received formal sovereignty, or
juridical independence, long before a cohesive national identity could develop. Osaghae (1999:
184) observes that in practice this lack of national identity was, and still is today, characterised
by the tendency of citizens to rather affiliate with ethnic, racial, religious and regional
organisations than to identify with and display loyalty to the state.
The third feature of weak states, which is further discussed in the latter part of this chapter, is
the presence of local strongmen who exercise social control over segments of the populations
who are nominally under state leaders' rule. These strongmen oppose rulers and the latter's
efforts to mobilise the population and resources under the former's control. Consequently,
leaders are unable to enforce social policy down to the level of the individual and to impose a
single set of rules, as this would automatically undermine the social control of the strongmen.
This creates an environment of conflict, which often escalates into full-scale civil war (Migdal,
1988: 261).
Fourthly, colonialism created a tradition of state intervention in almost every sector of the
economy. Over time, interventionism inevitably surpassed the state's administrative capacity,
causing, among other things, varying levels of institutional weakness and the lack of capacity of
government to implement policies. This led to the corrosion of judicial and regulatory functions
- notably because of arbitrary political interference and insufficient provision of public services
(Cornwell, 1999: 68; Baker, 1999).
High levels of corruption, personal ruiership and the absence of democratic rule and principles
of transparency and accountability often intensify the problem. Due to weak states' under-
resourced and underdeveloped institutional capacity, they experience tremendous obstacles in
mobilising the population and managing civil society. They are also unable to effectively
establish or expand their authority over large parts of the country, specifically areas that are
separatist, and sections of national life, such as the effective guarding of national boundaries,
tax collection, customs duties, and law enforcement (Osaghae, 1999: 184; Jackson, 2002: 39).
16
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
According to Reno (1998: 2) this virtually total absence of bureaucratic state institutions means
that outsiders assume a larger variety of political roles traditionally reserved for state
institutions, for example the provision of internal security.
Another distinct feature of weak states that distinguishes them from strong states, is economic
underdevelopment. According to Jackson (2002: 39) these states have "poorly integrated
mono-economies, heavy debt burdens, low or negative growth rates, high inflation and
unemployment, low levels of investment, and massive social inequalities."
However, this does not necessarily mean that there is an absence of economic activities -
quite the contrary. Reno (1995: 1) observes that weak states very often have strong and
efficient informal markets that function parallel to the more formal and inefficient markets. Weak
state leaders manipulate these informal markets to their full potential, as these provide the
resources and political support they need to ensure lasting political authority. This occurs at the
expense of the credibility and competence of the very state in which they hold office. The
manipulation of these markets involves a whole range of activities, including granting loyal
associates access to economic opportunities and assisting foreigners who wish to conceal their
illegal business transactions, for instance money laundering. A very important aspect of the
manipulation of markets is leaders' exploitation of scarce resources. Leaders use these
resources to finance their own operations, whether suppressing warlords and rebellious
populations, or enriching themselves and their cronies. This enables rulers to build a strong
network of national and international commercial contacts with which business could be
conducted (Reno, 2001).
Reno (2001: 5) identifies another feature of weak states, namely the use of child soldiers. Since
these children are themselves subject to the collapse of formal economies and state institutions,
they are desperate for ways to solve their personal predicament. Reno (2001: 6) states that
"they are often the most vigorous segments of most societies, yet also the most marginalised in
collapsing economies in corrupt states." Consequently, they exploit warfare in order to remedy
their marginal status and enrich themselves. They also have the perception that it is safer to be
associated with those bearing guns, than to be their victims.
The last main feature of weak states is their vulnerability to external international forces and
actors. This implies that they are easily manipulated from outside their borders and are
dependent on the industrialised countries for technology and manufactured goods imported at
outrageous prices. Because of this dependence, industrialised countries and even multinational
corporations (MNCs) have immense political and economic leverage over these states. For
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example, economic structural adjustment programmes - typically prescribed by the Intemational
Monetary Fund - compel politically unstable or undemocratic states to comply with democratic
political and liberal economic conditionalities. Another aspect where this external vulnerability
could be observed is the susceptibility of weak state borders to arms smuggling and refugee
movements (Jackson, 2002: 39).
The question arises: why do state capabilities vary? Why are some states strong, while others
are weak? What caused such a high number of African states to become, on the one hand,
giant organisations - employing thousands of workers and channelling vast amounts of revenue
- but on the other hand, failing to provide policies determining the daily conduct within the
societies they claim to rule? The following discussion will address these questions.
2.3 WEAK STATES AND SOCIAL CONTROL
According to Migdal (1988) the abilities and natures of contemporary African states are
influenced by their social structures, and the manner in which social control is distributed in their
different societies. This implies that one has to shift one's focus beyond the managerial ability
of rulers and administrators and the tools and resources they employ, to the vast number of
social organisations that surround and influence the state. In cases where these social
organisations are web-like - in other words, where social control is fragmented amongst various
organisations - states are confronted by immense obstacles in establishing and enforcing
effective policies.
Migdal is of the opinion that these social organisations and the social control they exercise did
not emerge by coincidence. They were the consequence of two series of interrelated forces
that radically changed many African societies during the nineteenth century. The first series
refers to the expansion of the world economy from Europe and its influence on all levels of
society, whilst the second series of forces concerns colonialism and the consequent creation
and maintenance of Western political domination in the imperial age. These forces caused
immense political, economic and social change and irrevocably altered the nature of these
societies.
2.3.1 Expansion of the World Economy
It would be incorrect to assume that the expansion of the world economy had only economic
repercussions. The process also had immense political consequences, since it initiated the
creation of government policies that intentionally undermined existing strategies of survival and
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social control in societies. This was certainly the case in Africa, where taxation and
transportation policies paved the way for European market penetration, rendering established
strategies of subsistence obsolete. For example, new taxation policies imposed by the colonial
powers changed the very nature of production, since it compelled Africans to increasingly focus
on export crops at the expense of their own subsistence crops (Migdal, 1988: 51). However,
these taxes could often not be legitimised, as many traditional societies produced their own
public services, for example finances and security, within smaller communities (Klvirnakl, 2001:
17).
Forced labour was also employed as a direct form of taxation or as a result of other types of
taxation. For instance, in order to employ cheap native labour, the colonialists imposed high
taxes on the natives and non-payment was punished by means of forced labour. Through the
implementation of these various taxation policies, the colonial powers could legally force
Africans to construct railways and other infrastructure and also to perform seasonal work at
commercial plantations. The consequences of these tax policies - which included migration,
forced labour and production for export - had an immense impact on existing structures of
social control (Migdal, 1988: 51,97).
It was not only the new tax policies that exercised an influence on social organisations. New
modes of transport, and more specifically the construction of railways, triggered a strong
economic revolution, causing tremendous social change and the subsequent weakening of old
customs of social control. It had, for instance, a detrimental affect on agriculture, as the greater
economies of scale rendered the products of small-scale farmers uncompetitive. Consequently,
many small-scale farmers lost their land and their only means of income (Migdal, 1988: 79).
New tax policies and modes of transport brought about an almost unimaginable transformation
in people's lives, as their most fundamental life conditions, including their homes and work, no
longer existed. These circumstances not only changed the particular forms of social control that
used to exist in societies, but it also widened the stratification gap within African states. In other
words, those members of society who had access to resources that could help them exploit the
new economic opportunities, were in the fortunate position to control the productive factors in
society. This had direct repercussions for people's social and political lives - their place of
residence, their occupation and the nature of agricultural organisation - and severely
undermined their traditional forms of survival. This in tum sparked the process of urbanisation,
causing large numbers of people to change their place of residence, and generating new job
opportunities, especially in the service sector. In addition, old strategies of survival - for
example subsistence agriculture and handicraft production - were made obsolete by land
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alienation and by new manufactured products, derived from plantation economies. This,
however, was not an easy feat, as the number of people displaced from old types of
employment far exceeded the number of available positions in new enterprises. The situation
was further aggravated by the explosion of African populations following the colonial powers'
pacification efforts as well as the institution of Western public health measures (Migdal, 1988:
81-83).
It is evident that the expansion of the world economy and the policies that facilitated the
incorporation of African societies into the European-dominated world economy had an
unanticipated and radically transforming effect on people's social relations. As people's life
situations changed, so did their needs and problems, causing old means, rewards, sanctions
and strategies of social control to become obsolete, thus spawning the overall weakening of
societies. For instance, as modes of production were modernised and people lost their land,
existing and well-known rewards - such as profiting from mutual work teams to harvest specific
crops - became irrelevant. In addition, people commuted to work, migrated from their villages
and made new friends, rendering old sanctions like community ostracism or gossip
meaningless. This was also the case with old mechanisms of resolving disputes, for example
through the mediation of the village elders, as interaction with people who did not know or
honour the elders, increased. Consequently social control had to be restored, and it is not
surprising then that new patterns of social control started to surface immediately. This
atmosphere of rapid change caused the various societies to act in different ways, explaining to
a certain extent the varying capabilities among contemporary developing states (Migdal, 1988:
86-98).
However, the Western-dominated market and the state policies that facilitated the deepening of
that market was not the only event that influenced African states' social organisations and the
social control they exercised. The second set of forces that radically influenced the national
social structure and the reconstruction of social control in many African societies was
associated with the establishing and preservation of political domination, mainly through the
political strategies of colonial powers (Migdal, 1988: 51).
2.3.2 Colonialism
Osaghae (1999: 185) is of the opinion that most African states were created by colonial powers
in the interest of their colonial enterprise and not in the interest of the colonised African
populations. Through the process of colonisation, the people of sub-Saharan Africa were
confrontedwith a multitude of new experiences that exposed them to new reference groups and
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overthrew old patterns of stratification. In the short historical interval of approximately 80 years,
the myriad civilisations and cultures of Africa were arbitrarily united into more or less 50 states,
without consideration for ethnic affinities and historical political boundaries. Hence several
nations were divided across new boundaries under various colonial authorities, while previously
hostile communities were grouped together in the new states.
A pressing need for low-cost but effective social control, as well as the fear of granting any
native leaders a potentially threatening monopoly of control, impelled colonial governors to offer
both tangible and intangible resources to strongmen. In order to establish the rules and to
manipulate the makers of the new social control, colonisers could follow two paths. They could
either make preferential access to resources available to various native leaders who could
establish social control in only a limited part of the society, or they could support indigenous
rulers who were in a position to build nationwide institutions, which could lead to a centralised
state. Since colonial objectives of stability and security could be better achieved through
policies that constructed and maintained a fragmented, web-like society with diverse poles of
power, colonial powers distributed resources amongst a large number of indigenous rulers,
dividing the area and inhibiting the creation of any bond of local solidarity. The comprehensive
resources available from outside, convinced rulers that the expensive, potentially destabilising
creation of centralised social control was unnecessary and in all likelihood dangerous (Migdal,
1988: 125-132).
However, the colonising powers were very concerned with who precisely benefited from their
rule, as the specific pattern of native social control, which existed in the governed society,
strongly influenced the colonial rulers' ability to maintain secure rule. Alliances with indigenous
strongmen had to be considered carefully, since rulers relied heavily on social organisations for
implementing policy and maintaining internal order. Thus colonial rulers determined who
among the indigenous figures would reap the benefits of the spreading world market, granting
them the opportunity to reconstitute social control in the wake of the catastrophic changes
(Migdal, 1988:106).
Naturally, this caused radical changes in the basis of social control. Since a Chiefs power no
longer depended on his role as warrior and military protector of his people, as was previously
the case, some Chiefs who had no former claim on leadership suddenly found themselves in
leadership positions thanks to Western backing and support. Once certain native strongmen
successfully implemented new strategies of survival, it was very difficult to significantly change
the configuration of social control in the specific society. Consequently, many of the Chiefs'
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subordinates openly resented the highly prized resources and privileges bestowed on these
leaders, as it was of great value in the new money economy (Migdal, 1988: 105, 111).
By pouring resources into the administrative arrangements and organisations of selected
strongmen, the colonialists influenced the emerging configurations of social life. Consequently,
after independence social control remained entrenched in social organisations other than the
state. Politics did not include state autonomy, the dominance of a single class, enforcement of
social policy down to the individual level, or even social control and mobilisation. To the
contrary, it exhibited diverse acts of compromise, manipulation and bribery. Although the
military was a useful tool in bringing discipline to politics and securing single party domination
by restraining factional strife and the struggle for control of the state, armies and parties could in
effect not change the arrangement of social control throughout societies. It is no surprise then
that control of the state was fiercely contested (Migdal, 1988: 130, 137).
2.3.3 Fragmented Social Control and State Leaders' Dilemma
In order to understand the restriction of state leaders' capabilities, which had been caused by
the concentration of social control outside of the state mechanisms, one has to focus on the
interrelationship between the indigenous population and the strongmen in remote towns and
villages. No single strongman had the ability to successfully rebel against the power of state
leaders. However, the sum total of the different strongmen's power in their various communities
could paralyse state leaders' efforts to increase state capabilities. Rulers could counter these
debilitating circumstances with either one of two measures. Firstly, extreme mechanisms could
be employed, for instance the replacement of certain strongmen. However, actions of this kind
were dangerous, and could only be utilised very selectively and cautiously, as effective social
control resided in the hands of the strongmen, limiting the mobilisation capabilities of the state.
A second, more frequently used measure of countering the influence of strongmen's social
control, manifested itself when funds and resources found their way into private hands, most
notably those of local strongmen (Migdal, 1988: 138).
Thus the colonial powers' practice of directing resources into the hands of certain indigenous
strongmen, while enforcing sanctions to the detriment of others, profoundly affected the
reconstitution of social control in indigenous communities. It presented scattered indigenous
strongmen with the means to build their own social control in fragments of the society. After
independence, this fragmentation of social control seriously limited the creation and growth of
state capabilities. Despite the fact that state leaders had all the resources at their disposal and
could eliminate every single strongman, they still faced immense restrictions. On the one hand,
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any significant attempt to expand their capabilities, for example to penetrate society, to govern
social relations and to distribute resources, would surely undermine the various strongmen's
autonomy and basis of social control. On the other hand, however, indigenous strongmen had
direct access to the various parts of the population they ruled and they could mobilise these
people for specific purposes. Consequently state leaders came to the realisation that their
tenure was heavily dependent of the social stability the strongmen could ensure through their
social control (Migdal, 1988: 141).
Why is social control and its fragmentation such a crucial aspect for state leaders? To answer
this question one first has to look at the important role played by effective state institutions. The
proper utilisation of state agencies is essential for a state leader's effectiveness and his ultimate
political survival. The employment of those agencies for mobilisation and security is particularly
important in that the mobilisation of human and material resources is essential for
accomplishing the state leader's objectives, whilst security agencies are called on to maintain
national security and defend the state against external aggressors. In view of these explicit
internal and external demands for strong state apparatus, creating strong state institutions is not
merely an abstract objective, but an urgent reality. Nevertheless, ironically one still finds that
state leaders with very limited mobilisational capabilities destroy the very state institutions that
could grant them mobilisational capabilities and enhanced security (Migdal, 1988: 207).
Just as effective state institutions influence political mobilisation, so does fragmented social
control also impact on this process. Societies with a variety of divergent social organisations,
each having its own rulemaking abilities, strongly oppose leaders' attempts to utilise the state as
a mechanism of sustained political mobilisation. As long as indigenous strongmen continue to
render feasible strategies of survival to members of their immediate societies, state leaders are
able to secure only limited public support, as the population has very little motivation to grant
such support. Consequently the only way for leaders to achieve sustained political mobilisation
is when they, in turn, are capable of providing viable strategies of survival to the population.
This calls for a comprehensive set of strong state agencies to distribute material incentives and
to arrange state services in a meaningful set of symbols (Migdal, 1988: 207-211).
Thus state leaders face a baffling paradox. On the one hand, they need to have strong state
agencies in place to induce political mobilisation and support in fragmented societies. On the
other hand, it is necessary to mobilise the population so that those same strong state agencies
will not threaten their political survival as state leaders. This is the dilemma of a number of state
leaders in Africa. The situation could aggravate when concerns about internal and external
destabilising factors urge leaders to centralise coercive capabilities in the hands of only a small
23
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
group of state agencies. Considering the means at their disposal, these state agencies
themselves pose a significant threat to state leaders. The only mechanism a leader could
employ to counter these threats from military and security forces arises through mobilising
agencies. Yet, in societies with fragmented social control, the mobilising capabilities of these
agencies are restricted, intensifying in turn the danger of a military coup (Migdal, 1988: 207-
210).
This paradox prompts state leaders to engage in a risk analysis, measuring their need for
effectiveness and security against the threat strong state agencies and potential power centres
hold to their own political survival. This implies, on the one hand, that rulers could proceed with
building state agencies, weighing various strong agencies against one another, and thus
preventing anyone of them from accumulating significant power. On the other hand, they could
forgo major institution building and concentrate on prohibiting the emergence of power centres,
particularly those with their own mobilisational capabilities. In the latter instance, state leaders
choose to decrease the immediate threats to their political survival by jettisoning the goal of
building efficient political mobilisational capabilities (Migdal, 1988: 211-213).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this dilemma - fragmented social control and the subsequent denial
of mobilisational capabilities to state leaders - has created a very specific political and
administrative style of ruling, referred to by Migdal (1988: 213) as the "politics of survival".
Some of the most popular means of the politics of survival involve the following strategies:
• "big shuffle", where leaders use their power to appoint and remove members from office
to prevent state agencies or state-sponsored political parties from becoming threats to
the executive leadership;
• "non-merit appointments", where leaders use kinship ties, common regional origins, and
shared ethnic and tribal backgrounds to appoint personnel in key posts; and
• "dirty tricks", which refer to unlawful imprisonment and expatriation, mysterious
disappearances, torture and execution.
The purpose of these strategies is to prevent leading officials in important agencies from using
their own capabilities against the central state leadership. However, leaders are restricted in
their use of these tactics and a fine balance has to be maintained. State agencies have to be
restrained to prevent them from posing a threat to the leader, while these same agencies have
to be allowed to perform the tasks necessary for state and leader survival. If successful, the
politics of survival could lead to the extended existence of regimes and particular leaders.
However, on the down side, this has prevented the state from enhancing its capabilities by not
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allowing the development of effective state institutions, causing institutional weakness in many
African states.
State leaders' tenure is not only threatened by internal state agencies, but also by the existence
of power centres outside of formal state institutions, which have their own independent
mobilisational capabilities and distinct viewpoints of the types of rules that society may need.
The management of these threats depends on the size and scope of the social organisation.
Organisations with a limited scope and small body of supporters - such as those ruled by local
strongmen in rural areas - pose a limited threat to state leader's political survival. Although the
aggregate of social control that indigenous strongmen exercise, prevents leaders from
expanding the state's mobilisational capacity, the threat posed by any single strongman is
negligible. Consequently the same fragmentation of social control that prevents state leaders
from developing the state's mobilisational capabilities, also assists them in terms of stability by
restricting the creation of common social identities and frameworks comprehensive enough to
develop into strong social organisations that could challenge state leaders' rule (Migdal, 1988:
227).
However, the situation may be completely different for large social organisations with a broader
scope than that of indigenous strongmen. Leaders of weak states often harbour a similar kind
of fear relating to the mobilisational capabilities of these organisations than they have vis a vis
powerful state institutions. Rulers have three distinct mechanisms at their disposal to deal with
the threats posed by these societal power centres. Firstly, rulers may employ "dirty tricks", for
example the execution of political activists and political party leaders. However, this method
can only be used to a limited degree. Because rulers have severed the capacity of state
agencies to provide the populace with meaningful strategies of survival, it is in the hands of
large social organisations or businesses to provide those strategies. These businesses may
also have a positive impact on the economy. A second mechanism that weak state rulers may
employ is the incorporation óf social organisations into state institutions or state-allied
institutions, and the subsequent elimination of major power centres outside the mechanisms of
state. The last method leaders apply to limit the influence of social organisations, which provide
revenues for the state or components for the survival strategies of the population, is known as
"accommodating capital". State leaders face increasing international pressure for economic
efficiency. In order to achieve this, they have to create processes through which these new
power centres could be accommodated in society without becoming threats to their own political
tenure. These power centres also need to be convinced that the regime and its rulers would
protect their interests. This is usually achieved through cooptation and the utilisation of
discriminatory policies that favour these powerful social organisations to the detriment of smaller
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fragmented organisations. Such policies include special privileges, appointments to state
organisations, favourable tax and income transfer policies, tariffs and licensing (Migdal, 1988:
229,235).
Hence - despite all the resources and agencies at the disposal of state leaders - some states
still continue to be weak. According to Migdal (1988: 236) the nub of this problem is the
dilemma of state leaders: their inability to effectively counter the fragmentation of social control,
which forced them to adopt very distinct political policies. These policies impede the state's
ability to develop strong and effective state institutions, which could mobilise the population and
present new strategies of survival. Thus these destructive policies limit the process of state-
making in Africa.
2.4 THE PROCESS OF STATE-MAKING IN AFRICA
Herbst (2000: 31) states the following with regard to state-making in Africa:
"For a truly comparative study of politics to develop, the great but incomplete
drama of African state creation must be understood ... By examining both the
environment that leaders had to confront and the institutions they created in light
of their own political calculations, the entire trajectory of state creation in Africa
can be recovered ... [Pjolitical outcomes are the result of human agency
interacting with powerful geographic and historical forces. And ... the viability of
African states depends on leaders successfully meeting the challenges posed by
their particular environment. "
According to Ayoob (1996: 38) the process of state-making can be understood as the
accumulation of central state power. It includes the extension and unification of territory and the
establishment of order within this territory (by means of war), the maintenance of order
(policing) and the obtaining of resources to maintain the war and policing activities as well as
the various state mechanisms (taxation). However, these activities can only be successfully
executed if the state complies with the Weberian prerequisite of monopolising legitimate
organised violence in the territory and among the population it controls (Weber, 1947: 326).
Thus the concentration of power in the hands of the agents of the state is of utmost importance
for the state-making process. In states where the process is still in its elementary phases, state
makers tend to use more coercive and forceful strategies in their attempt to accumulate power.
This, in turn, leads to reciprocal violence from local strongmen who oppose the state makers'
attempts to accumulate power and impose order (Ayoob, 1996: 39).
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State-making in Africa never took place in this prescribed manner, as Africans had very little
opportunity to try their hands at this endeavour. Instead, the traditional politics and social
structures of native Africans were "replaced by a new abstract colonial state whose extensive
rights were founded on an impersonal doctrine of sovereignty quite alien to most African
cultures" (Cornwell, 1999: 62). This implies that the institutions of the colonial state, such as the
legislature, bureaucracy, military, and monetary and judiciary systems were imposed on
Africans without any consideration for their political and institutional development.
Furthermore, the nature of the state inherited by Africa's independent rulers posed immense
obstacles. The colonial powers transferred the foreign notion of statehood to Africa and
coerced the continent into a pattern of territoriality and sovereignty. However, some essential
aspects of state theory were not immediately transferred. In the first instance, the colonial
states based their power on domination and on the capability to force their authority on the
subordinate population in order to obtain the taxes needed for the maintenance of the colonial
state apparatus - the typical features of state-building. However, the colonial powers did not
intimate to their subordinates that there were limitations to the power of the state. This explains
why much of independent Africa adapted authoritarian rule and why some of Africa's new rulers
decided that the limitations set on the absolute power of the state, which were only introduced
during the immediate approach to independence, could be dispensed with (Cornwell, 1999: 63).
Secondly, the colonial agenda made no provision for the transformation of the state into a
nation, as it was not in the interests of the colonisers that the colonised peoples should be
united into a single nation (Osaghae, 1999: 15). Thus the concept of nationhood, as
complementary to the state, and the dangers of independent statehood, were introduced at a
very late stage, and in some instances not at all (Cornwell, 1999: 63).
The fragmented distribution of social control, the delayed establishment of institutions of
democratic politics and the exclusion of Africans from the political sphere until shortly before
independence, meant that many countries became independent without grasping the intricacies
of modern democratic politics and state-building. Notwithstanding this, the new independent
African states were still expected to be full-scale social welfare states with advanced
mechanisms, simultaneously engaging in complex drives for social and economic development
in an environment of population explosion, increasing technological and economic gaps,
superpower conflict and global tension. Faced by these challenges, it is no wonder that most
post-colonial states lacked a clear consensus on how they should be governed. As a result,
independence only entailed the substitution of the colonial rulers by local rulers, without any
fundamental transformation in the character of the colonial state: the prevalence of authoritarian
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and military regimes is a continuation of the military nature of the colonial state; political leaders'
lack of accountability may be ascribed to the continued separation between state and society;
and the structural dependence established by the colonial regime is to some extent to blame for
the economic problems of the post-colonial state (Osaghae, 1999: 186).
After independence, a common strategy followed by the new rulers included the creation of a
vague nationalism, which during the Cold War commonly found expression in national policies
of economic self-sufficiency and internationally in the diplomacy of non-alignment.
Theoretically, this had to go hand in hand with the mobilisation of the population in order to
increase prosperity and improve the efficiency of the public administration. However, in
practice, rulers were confronted with threats from their own subordinates, usually from the
military forces.' Rulers immediately responded by undermining military command structures
through the manipulation of factional disputes within armed forces. They also created various
special units, informal paramilitary forces and palace guards. Although this rendered a higher
level of short-term security for leaders, the long-term effect was the unrestricted distribution of
arms and military knowledge in societies. According to Reno (2001: 3) "most African warlords
originate in this context of fragmented military organisation, and come to the fore once the
centralising power of the previous strongman leader collapses." Almost all the warlords in the
DRC, Liberia and Somalia once occupied high positions in the governments they later attacked.
Indeed, the effects of colonialism did not end with the realisation of independence - it
continued, though in more subtle ways, under neo-colonialism. During the Cold War, a large
number of Africa's weak states were aided by patronage from the superpowers. This enabled
them to restrain local strongmen with the use of superior weapons, bribe political opponents,
and suppress domestic opposition under the cover of anti-imperialism or anti-communism -
Mobutu Sese Seko's regime was a typical example of this process. However, the end of the
Cold War, and the subsequent loss of aid, signalled the demise of these old forms of politics.
Old external patrons either pressed for economic and political reform, or simply disappeared, as
in the case of the Soviet Union. This undermined the ability of weak state rulers to maintain
their regimes without resorting to war or reinventing new and innovative forms of patrimonialism.
Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union, in addition to the Eastern bloc successor states'
need to increase export earnings, transformed Soviet military aid into a private arms market,
releasing cheap arms into the global market. This cheap weaponry gave strongmen the
opportunity to arm themselves and to directly confront vulnerable leaders (Jackson, 2002: 44;
Reno, 1998: 46).
1 At the turn of the century, military rulers had replaced more than half of Africa's civilian govemments and between
1970 and 1989, 53 out of 74 changes of government were accompanied by violence (Reno, 2001: 3).
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In the twenty first century, the structural characteristics of weak states put decision and
policymakers under extreme pressure, transforming weak state politics into a continuous
process of crisis management. Rulers have to manage both internal and external demands to
sustain some semblance of sovereignty, usually by way of "elite accornmodetton"." Internally,
they need to constantly safeguard their authority and manage local strongmen. Externally, they
have to manage or accommodate the demands of great power patrons, international financial
institutions, multinational corporations, and inter-governmental organisations in order to ensure
access to resources and to avoid sanctions (Jackson, 2002: 40-41).
Thus it is clear that state-making in its pure sense hardly ever received any attention in the pre-
or post-colonial state. Consequently the state-making process currently evident in African
states is comparable to the process found in Western Europe during the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries, where state building was initiated in the midst of a decentralised, mainly peasant
social structures. During this process, a myriad of semi-autonomous authorities had to be
eliminated or subordinated in the drive towards differentiated, centralised, autonomous
institutions with effective control over territories. This endeavour caused immense suffering,
resistance and loss of life and rights as large parts of the European population strongly resisted
the state-making process. The process lasted for three to four hundred years, with the Western
European states only emerging as responsive and representative modem states in the early
twentieth century (Ayoob, 1996: 40).
The basic common characteristics of the process of state building explain why the state-making
process in various contemporary African states strongly resembles several dimensions of the
state-making process in Western Europe a few hundred years ago. However, this is where the
similarities end. The difference in the speed at which state building has to be introduced and
achieved as well as the radically changed international environment in which it has to proceed,
explains why African state makers find themselves in an invidious position. In order to imitate
the Western European process of state building, African state makers need adequate time as
well as the freedom to persuade and coerce a diversity of recalcitrant groups within its
populations to acknowledge the legitimacy of state boundaries and institutions, to allow the
state to regulate certain aspects of their lives and to accept the extraction of resources by the
state. However, state makers cannot rely on either of these two requirements since they are
not adequately available for the leaders' utilisation (Ayoob, 1996: 41).
2 This implies that, ''to sustain a meaningful semblance of sovereignty, rulers need to cut informal deals with
individuals who exercise power in their own right" (Reno, 1998: 2).
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African state makers are not in a position to prolong the expensive and traumatic process of
state-making over a protracted period of time, as was the case in Europe. The high level of
competition between firmly established modern states within the state system and the efficacy
of socially legitimate and administratively well-established and competent institutions impel
weak state rulers to either accelerate the state building process, or to face international disdain
and permanent marginalisation within the international system. Consequently state makers are
compelled to converge several consecutive phases of the state-making process into one
enormous state-building effort. More often than not, this effort becomes ungovernable as the
pressure on the political system exceeds the political and military capabilities of the state,
causing the escalation of crisis upon crisis. In addition, state makers' tasks are even further
complicated by the demand for the humane treatment of the populations under their nominal
rule and limited violation of human rights. This scenario goes a long way towards explaining the
problems of legitimacy, authority and governance with which African state-makers are
confronted (Ayoob, 1996: 41).
2.5 SUMMARY
From the preceding discussion it is clear that African states employing child soldiers do not
exhibit the characteristics typically associated with sovereign, independent states. Instead,
these states exhibit their own distinct set of characteristics: they experience serious problems of
legitimacy; they suffer from a lack of cohesive national identity; local strongmen play an
important role; state intervention is evident in almost every sector of the economy; informal
markets exist parallel to formal markets; they are economically underdeveloped; they often
utilise child soldiers; and they are vulnerable to external international forces and actors. In brief,
these states are weak.
Migdal (1988) is of the opinion that the social structures influence at the most basic level the
abilities and nature of these African states and the way in which social control is distributed
within society. These social organisations and the social control they exercise are the
consequence of two series of events: the expansion of the world economy historically radiating
from Europe, and more latterly, colonialism.
The expansion of the world economy and the policies that accompanied it radically transformed
the African population's social relations and rendered traditional strategies of social control
obsolete. This meant that social control had to be restored, and in this conjunction the
colonialists played a crucial role. As the colonial powers were foreign, exercising no internal
social control, they had to establish social control through other means, without threatening their
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own power bases. The easiest manner to achieve this was to offer resources to a number of
indigenous strongmen, preventing anyone strongman from centralising all power and inhibiting
the creation of a bond of local solidarity. However, these privileges were only granted to
strongmen who were of particular use to the colonial powers. This allowed certain strongmen to
build social control in fragments of the society, to the detriment of others.
Consequently, since African states achieved their independence this fragmentation of social
control has seriously undermined the creation and growth of state capabilities, as any attempt
from state leaders to expand their capabilities threatens the various strongmen's autonomy,
causing conflict. However, state leaders' tenure is dependent on the social stability the
strongmen can ensure, as they are able to mobilise their people for specific purposes. The only
way in which state leaders could secure long-term support from these fragmented societies is
through strong state agencies, which have the ability to distribute material incentives and
provide state services. This in turn creates a dilemma for state leaders. On the one hand, they
need strong state agencies to mobilise fragmented societies. On the other hand it is necessary
to mobilise the population so that these same strong state institutions would not threaten their
political survival. Thus rulers have to decide whether they would continue major institution
building and fend off potential threatening power centres, or whether they would relinquish
major institution building, and sacrifice the objective of building efficient mobilisational
capabilities. Leaders also face threats from power centres outside formal state institutions,
which they either have to fend off or accommodate. This has led to the adoption of a very
specific style of ruling, referred to as the "politics of survival".
However, the state leaders' dilemma does not only threaten the political survival of those same
rulers, but also severely limits the already crippled state-making process, since it prevents
agents of the state from accumulating central state power and imposing order. This has been
further exacerbated by the nature of the state African rulers inherited at independence, the
delayed establishment of institutions of democratic politics by colonialists, the exclusion of
Africans from the political sphere until shortly before independence, and the payment of
patronage by the superpowers during the Cold War. All these obstacles escalated and became
a vicious cycle. Social fragmentation is persisting and politics have become a continuous
process of crisis management with leaders trying to manage both internal and external threats
to their political survival. As a result, the state-making process is still in its infant stage, putting
state leaders under immense pressure to engage in an enormous state-building effort.
In conclusion, African states in which child soldiers are utilised are characterised by weak
political systems and governments. Social fragmentation has created an environment that is
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hostile towards state leaders' attempts to build strong state institutions and to mobilise the
populenon. Accordingly, state leaders have adopted various strategies to manage this hostile
situation and to ensure their political survival. These survival strategies have the potential to
cause immense friction within societies, and can easily escalate into total war. These
strategies, together with the socio-economic conditions inside weak states, provoke
circumstances that increase the potential for conflict. This provides the focus of Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER3
CONFLICT IN AFRICA
3.1 BACKGROUND
By and large, the political scenario in Africa is bleak. Over the last 40 years an astounding
portion of the African continent has been at war. At no time has the sheer scale of war been as
widespread and prevalent as is currently the case in Africa. Of the 30 serious conflicts in the
contemporary world, about half could be found in Africa. During 2000, almost 66 percent of the
100 000 people killed worldwide by means of armed conflicts was in Sub-Saharan Africa and 75
percent of the countries in the region experienced some form of armed conflict (Southern Links,
2001). The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan (United Nations, 1998), observes that the
"consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term
stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples." These wars include both inter- and intra-state
conflicts.
During the last three decades, Angola has been devastated by an intense civil war between the
government and rebel forces (Shukman, 2000:1). In Burundi, civil war erupted in 1993,
resulting in an estimated 200 000 deaths (Global Issues, 2001b). Rwanda continues to live with
the consequences of the 1994 genocide that changed the demographic structure of the whole
population and resulted in a shortage of adult males and a high number of orphans
(Government of Rwanda, 2000: 7). In Sierra Leone, government forces, international
peacekeepers and armed groups were in fierce conflict with each other from 1991 until 2002
when Sierra Leone eventually embarked on a process of peace-building (Mcintyre and Thusi,
2003: 73). Civil war and factional fighting have besieged Somalia for the past decade, with no
faction controlling more than a fraction of the territory (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, 2001b). Civil war has persisted virtually non-stop in the Sudan since 1983 and, while
many parts of Uganda enjoy peace and development, a number of areas continue to be
affected by armed conflict and other forms of insecurity (Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning
and Economic Development, 2001). According to Jackson (2002: 30) these internal conflicts
tend to be extremely severe and costly in terms of lives and refugees.
Inter-state conflicts are also prevalent. The conflict in the DRC has involved the forces of at
least eight countries and numerous armed groups and has been characterised by appalling,
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widespread, and systematic human rights violations, including mass killings and ethnic
cleansing (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001b).
3.2 CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA
Although the current causes of African conflicts seem to be diverse in scope and intensity, they
are, according to Migdal (1988), in essence caused by the fragmentation of social control and
the subsequent dilemma of state leaders, as discussed in Chapter 2. Reno (1998:1) is of the
opinion that weak state rulers have no intention creating a state that serves a collective good, or
even creating institutions that may stimulate ideas of political and economic individualism and
as a result threaten rulers' exercise of power. Instead, their main objectives are political survival
and the maintenance of an integrated state. With a combination of tactful manipulation, weak
states can maintain some degree of stability for long periods, despite internal disorder,
corruption and poor economic performance. Nonetheless, they are constantly vulnerable to
internal and external shocks, and are often compelled to adopt strategies to neutralise these
shocks (Jackson, 2002: 40; Reno, 2001; Reno, 1998). These strategies, together with the
socio-economic conditions inside weak states, create circumstances, which increase the
likelihood and continuation of war. These strategies and socio-economic conditions are a
convenient point of departure to explain the causes of conflicts in Africa.
3.2.1 Poverty
Poverty plays an extremely important role in the occurrence and continuation of conflict. Those
countries that are torn apart by conflict average a Gross National Product (GNP) roughly one-
third of that of non-warring states. Amoako (2000: 13) notes that endemic poverty and wide
inequalities of income are reliable predictors of conflict. He states that "conflict is inextricably
related to poverty, particularly the lack of human capital, which influences the probability of civil
war." Poverty of this magnitude contributes to the emergence of war by exacerbating
underlying tensions and depriving governments of the means of ending wars. In addition, poor
people, and specifically children, are easy and cheap sources of recruitment, as they have little
to lose from joining a rebellion. Poverty also contributes to the continuation of war, since it
offers economic opportunities, for example the capture of valuable natural resources that are
usually unavailable in times of peace (Tshitereke, 2003: 87). This set the stage for weak state
rulers to employ their survival strategies.
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3.2.2 Exclusive Politics, Political Centralisation and Authoritarianism
Exclusive politics, political centralisation, and authoritarianism are very often the root of internal
conflicts. Strategies to enforce them are necessary since the state does not have the relative
autonomy required to make reform viable, despotism unnecessary and true democracy
possible. According to Jackson (2002: 42) these modes of governance disguise the incapacity
of rulers to convert their power into functional political, economic and cultural policies. From the
viewpoint of the ruling elite, political centralisation and exclusion has the advantage of
depoliticising an already fragmented society. This is achieved by suppressing the effective
political participation of the population, intimidating them with state power and concentrating all
power within a small dominant part of the population. This was the case in Somalia where Siad
Barre, the Head of State, favoured members of the ruling clan alliance - the Mareehan, Ogaden
and Dulhante - and committed acts of violence against the Issaq and the Majerteen. He also
mobilised various clans and factions in the Somali society and played them against each other
in order to avoid the emergence of a strong unified anti-government coalition (Kivimaki, 2001:
20,26).
Furthermore the ruling elite also initiates violence by means of militia recruitment, they often
monopolise the extraction of scarce resources and grant exclusive export contracts. They even
employ the state's defence forces as military-industrial enterprises, and procure external
mercenary armed forces to support them in their fight against domestic rebels (Allen, 1999:
371).
Inequality and distributional grievances further exacerbate the problem. They entail inequality
between groups and are encountered on three mutually reinforcing levels, namely economic,
social and political. Many African governments find it problematic to enforce distributive justice.
Because they are controlled by elitist groups in whose favour the distribution of public goods is
biased, these states do not have the necessary autonomy or neutrality to function as effective
agents of distributive justice, implying that government behaviour is particularly discriminatory
against a certain group or groups in society (Amoako, 2000: 13).
It is important to note that these strategies frequently have deep historical roots. As stated in
Chapter 2, colonial authorities governed the economy very strictly in order to restrict the flow of
wealth to the population. Consequently this left the population with a "precarious material base"
and the need to establish their authority. The absence of a population with a firmly established
economic base and opportunities to engage in the private accumulation of wealth compelled
them to take direct control of the state, converting politics into a material struggle. This struggle
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for control of the state normally only reaches equilibrium when one opponent or contesting
group emerges as the victor (Jackson, 2002: 42).
Jackson (2002: 43) is of the opinion that this class struggle and extreme competition provides
the ideal circumstances for the development of "Caesarism, whereby a leader is entrusted with
great power and arbitrates in an absolutist form of government." Such rulers preserve their
power via the "illegal appropriation of state revenues and the establishment of corruption in a
network of patrons and clients."
The situation in Liberia is a typical example of a war caused by the fragmentation of social
control and the subsequent rise of political centralisation and authoritarianism. The country has
experienced continuous political and economic difficulties since 1971, as well as intense power
struggles between the ruling elite. Samuel Doe, President of Liberia at the onset of the conflict,
came to power after a violent coup d'éfaf by the army in April 1980. In order to safeguard his
standing and ward off all opponents, Doe, a Krahn, bribed the Krahn and Mandingo
communities by granting them employment and commercial opportunities. In 1985 he brutally
suppressed a rebellion attempt by his main rival, Thomas Quinwonkpa, and "resorted to a
particularly poisonous form of ethnic manipulation which was to have consequences in the
ethnic pogroms of 1990" (Ellis, 1998: 157). To intensify the situation, at the outbreak of the
conflict the Liberian economy was corroded, national debt was escalating, public institutions
were flagrantly mismanaged and the government was autocratic and over-militarised.
According to Dunn (1999: 96) the Liberian society was on the brink of total breakdown when the
insurgence gave it its final shove.
Civil war began at the end of 1989 when Charles Taylor invaded Liberia from the Cote d'ivoire
border with 150 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fighters. Doe responded by
slaughtering hundreds of people in Nimba County for presumably collaborating with the rebels.
In response, thousands rallied to join the NPFL. Shortly thereafter, an Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) monitoring group, ECOMOG, was sent to Liberia as a
peacekeeping force, but failed to halt the fighting. The conflict degenerated into a brutal ethnic
war as the NPFL battled ECOMOG, President Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL),
and a splinter group known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Not
long afterwards, in September 1990, Doe was executed. Through the 1990s, various
transitional governments ruled Liberia, as cease-fires were agreed upon and broken. Finally, in
August 1996, ECOMOG was able to begin a disarmament programme to clear landmines and
reopen roads, allowing refugees to return. In 1997 presidential and legislative elections were
held, in which Charles Taylor's party, the National Patriotic Party, won a clear majority of seats
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in the National Assembly. However, this was not the beginning of a utopia for Liberia. Rebels
began a new conflict in mid-2000 and in 2002 brought the fighting close to Monrovia (Jackson,
2002: 43; Peace Pledge Union Online, 2002; OnWar, 2000).
The start of the war in Liberia was also the start of the process of political decay. Since the
inception of the war, it was clear that the rebels' strategy, and specifically the NPFL's, was to
break down state and social structures, and to centralise all political power in the hands of
Charles Taylor. In order to secure the military victory required to ensure Taylor's presidency,
the NPFL established a strategy of systematically executing all state authority figures, including
chiefs, government officials, doctors, teachers, nurses and administrators. Recollections
abound about how NPFL members and other rebels - belonging to the multiplicity of armed
factions that emerged in the brutal contest for loot and influence - beheaded rural state
authority figures. The slaughterers believed that these killings would create job vacancies for
them to fill. They believed that the more state officials they executed, the more rapidly the state
would become theirs with all its presumed wealth and power. Not even the economic
institutions were spared during this well-executed state disintegration. After assuring the
German-owned company of Bong Mines - one of the main foreign exchange earning
establishments, employing thousands of people - that the mine would be preserved, Taylor
nevertheless went ahead and destroyed it. This lunacy of reckless destruction was repeated in
Nimba, at the Swedish-American iron ore mining company, which also provided several health
and education facilities to the population (Kamara, 2001).
After Taylor's election as President, Liberia has plunged further down the abyss of terror and
thievery, eventually spurring a new conflict in mid-2000. For example, the custom of traditional
chieftaincy, with its resilient law and order regimes has been discarded and replaced by the
unquestioned authority of the rebel leaders, the new authority figures. The political
subdivisions, known as counties, have all but totally disintegrated and are administered by
feared former rebel commanders with no relations or ties in the areas under their authority.
Cultural societies, such as the Poro and the Sande, traditional entities of authority, symbolising
cohesion and security for many rural dwellers and peasants, have been totally corrupted and
robbed of their significance. To ensure that these institutions fall within Taylor's framework of
lawlessness and disorder, he commanded all cabinet ministers to become members of these
societies irrespective whether the ministers had any interest or allegiance to them or not.
Members refusing to obey such orders lose their jobs and are often charged for transgressions
they did not commit. In most parts of the country outside Monrovia, the courts have
deteriorated into virtual non-existence, and have been replaced by the custom of trial by ordeal,
known as Sassywood, which primarily employs torture to coerce confessions from the accused.
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The ancient tradition of accepting the authority, insight and wisdom of an elder's verdict has
been replacedwith the authority, insight and wisdom of armed and drugged rebels. Many of the
new "state officials" are unpaid and live off the population - soldiers are abandoning the military
to search for a daily living through other means, mainly by harassing civilians (Kamara, 2001).
As is evident from Liberia's example, the strategies of exclusive politics, political centralisation
and authoritarianism are risky. When excluded or targeted groups attempt to protect
themselves or take over the state, the struggle for domination or the utilisation of severe
repression could well snowball into total armed conflict (Jackson, 2002: 43).
Another strategy, namely ethnic politics, is closely related to the strategy of exclusive politics.
3.2.3 Ethnic Politics
Adedeji (1999: 9) states the following with regard to ethnic politics:
"There is growing evidence to support the view that the elites in African societies,
particularly members of the political class, have shown no restraint in
manipulating the people through feeding them with prejudices against and
stereotypes about other ethnic groups to win their support for achieving their own
self-centred objectives ... Personal interests and ambitions of such leaders are
framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally group
support even at the risk of developing animosity against another group which is
considered the enemy. This sometimes degenerates into the incidence of
people-to-people violence and pogroms. "
As discussed in Chapter 2, colonial rulers created social fragmentation and intensified ethnic
tensions by deliberately supporting some ethnic and religious groups at the expense of others.
According to Jackson (2002: 42) "ethnic politics in Africa have their roots in the contradictions
inherent in the exercise of state power by colonial authorities seeking to establish hegemony.
Ethnic identity formation facilitated indirect rule, which in turn retarded emergent class
consciousness." After independence, the new weak state rulers also utilised the strategy of
ethnic appeal in an effort to establish domination. They made ethnic identity the basis for
political participation and aimed to strengthen the competitive power of the ethnic groups to
which the leaders of the ruling party belonged. Consequently the high premium placed on
political power produced a zero-sum ethnic struggle for dominance. These divide-and-rule
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policies produced permanent ethnically linked economic and political inequalities, which helped
to fuel continuing cycles of rebellion and repression.
In addition the competition for political power exacerbates ethnic tensions as political leaders
often attempt to mobilise supporters through appeals to ethnicity. Cultural repression is also a
characteristic of conflict-prone areas, as ruling groups are often prejudiced against groups with
different languages and cultures in the name of "national integration".
In addition, the globalisation .of ethnic demands, which are facilitated by international
organisations and human rights groups, can also place immense pressure on weak state rulers,
since they often promote internal mobilisation which further weakens the efficiency of the state,
and force rulers to adopt risky political strategies to manage their decreasing hegemony. The
pitfalls of this strategy are that it could easily spiral into total war (Jackson, 2002: 42; Creative
Associates International, 1996). This was the case in the DRC, Rwanda and the Sudan.
Although there are a number of complex reasons for conflict in the DRC, the original issues are
ethnicity and land rights, involving the Banyamulenge, who are ethnic Tutsis, and who have
been inhabitants of the Kivu region for ages. In common with most conflicts in Africa, the
current situation dates back to the period of colonialism. The Banyamulenge were originally
part of the Tutsi Kingdom in present-day Rwanda, but in 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium
extended the Belgian Congo up to Lake Kivu in the east, dividing Tutsiland between the
German colony of Rwanda and the Belgian territory of Kivu to the west of Rwanda. The
Belgian colonial administration never recognised an indigenous native authority for the
Banyamulenge Tutsis.
In 1981, Mobutu Sese Seko, the then Head of State of Zaire, used the historical fact that land
rights could only be .vested in native authorities, to deprive the Banyamulenge Tutsis of Kivu
from their citizenship of Zaire, because they were of foreign origin. As a result, the
Banyamulenge of Kivu were abandoned without land rights and citizenship. Subsequently, in
1993, thousands of ethnic Tutsis fled before the newly elected Hutu-based government in
Rwanda, and settled in Kivu. In 1996, in response to this intrusion, Mobutu announced a plan
to expel 300 000 Zaireans of Tutsi ethnicity from the country, including the Banyamulenge who
are linked to the Tutsis, in an attempt to bolster local support and weaken the sources of
opposition. The announcement was widely supported and Tutsis were attacked in the capital,
Kinshasa. In response, Laurent Kabila's Tutsi-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Zaire-Congo (ADFL) revolted, which led to a vicious civil war that caused the overthrow of
Mobutu Sese Seko's regime (Breytenbach, 1999: 8; Global Issues; 2001b).
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Rwanda's feud between the Hutus and the Tutsis also has a long history, caused by ethnic
hatred, as well as by disputes over land tenure and property ownership. In brief the Belgian
colonial government opted to consolidate its power through Tutsi chiefs and hence appointed
certain of these elements in prominent positions, allowing them privileged access to state
resources and economic opportunities. The Belgians also instituted the carrying of identity
cards, ensuring that identity would be based on ethnicity. Consequently, the minority group
Tutsis ruled over the majority Hutus for many years, leading to hatred among some members of
the Hutu population, particularly those in the north. During a bloody Hutu rebellion in 1959,
many displaced Tutsis were forced to resettle elsewhere in Rwanda, while another 10 000 took
the road to exile (Twum-Danso, 2003: 25).
In 1973 Juvenal Habyarimana became President of Rwanda after a palace coup by northern
Hutus, particularly members of his Bushiru clan. Habyarimana and his supporters promptly
consolidated their power at the expense of southern Hutus and specifically Tutsis. As a result,
by 1980, 80 percent of the senior ranks in the army were occupied by Bushiru Hutus. During
the 1980-1990s, President Habyarimana's government used population density and land
shortages as an excuse to keep the Tutsi refugees from returning to Rwanda." As a result, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting of mainly Tutsis, was established in neighbouring
Uganda. In October 1990, the RPF attacked from Uganda, stating its intention to remove
Habyarimana as Head of State, and to make possible the return of the hundreds of thousands
of Rwandan refugees who had lived in exile for a generation. During 1993 Habyarimana and
his supporters were confronted with the imminent loss of power, following a dramatic military
advance by the RPF and a peace settlement favouring the rebels. In essence, this loss of
power resulted in the last and most gruesome genocide of the century, in which at least half a
million people perished at the hand of the Hutus - including as many as three-quarters of the
Tutsi population (Creative Associates International, 1996).
Thus in retrospect one finds that the 1994 genocide was not the result of an uncontrollable
outburst of rage by a people consumed by ancient tribal hatreds, but the result of a deliberate
choice made by a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power. In the first
instance, these few power holders set the majority against the minority to counter a growing
political opposition within the state. For instance, they stockpiled weapons and passed them on
to Hutu militias as part of the planning for the systematic butchery of the minority Tutsis
3 The 1993 Arusha Accords authorised refugees who return to their land within ten years to reoccupy their homes and
land. However, this implicated that "old case load" Tutsi refugees, initially displaced during the Hutu rebellion in
1959, had no rights to their own homesteads.
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(Tshitereke, 2003: 85). Thereupon, confronted with the RPF's victories on the battlefield and at
the negotiating table, this small elitist group transformed the strategy of ethnic division into
genocide. They were convinced that the genocide would revive the solidarity of the Hutu under
their leadership and help them to win the war. Thus they seized control of the state and used its
machinery and authority to carry out their slaughter and their personal campaign. As Berry and
Berry (1999: 3) put it:
ti ••• the genocide in Rwanda ... was organised and implemented by a small
group of extremist politicians using every means possible to hold power.
Unaccountable before the law, this small group of individuals transformed
racial extremism, oppression, and violence into legitimate means of exercising
political authority. "
The Sudan's protracted war is, in essence, also rooted in ethnic and religious hatred. The
people of southern Sudan, who are primarily followers of the Christian faith, have been under
siege from their own government in the north since the country gained independence from
Britain in 1956. The current conflict began in 1983 and intensified after a 1989 coup by the
National Islamic Front. Since then, the government in Khartoum has been systematically
eliminating southern Sudanese people for political and religious reasons (Sailhan, 1999: 2;
Tooiis, 1998: 30).
Weak state rulers also manipulate democratic processes and mechanisms to manage the
structural weaknesses of their states.
3.2.4 Manipulation of Democratic Processes and Mechanisms
In the post-Cold War era, a number of African rulers were forced to accommodate internal and
external pressures for multi-party democracy, effective governance and higher levels of political
participation, resulting in the adoption of multi-party democracy by means of competitive
elections. It is significant that many rulers have not only managed the transition to multi-party
democracy successfully, but also succeeded in retaining control of the state. However, this was
usually achieved through the subtle, and sometimes open, manipulation of domestic rivalry and
international perceptions. For example, many of the registered opposition parties in Angola are
in fact a disguise for the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party.
Essentially, this strategy intends to convince international financial institutions that governments
adhere to political reform conditions (Jackson, 2002: 43).
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However, in some instances democracy increases the possibility of war by reinforcing the power
of "chauvinistic ethno-nationalist forces". For example, in the Sudan, democracy strengthened
the hand of Muslim organisations that were hostile to the non-Muslim south, consequently
causing an intensification of the civil war (Hirsch, 2001). Thus, as is the case with the other
strategies, it is evident that the manipulation of democratic processes and mechanisms is a
high-risk strategy, which could cause immense civil violence.
According to Reno (2001: 3-6) one of the most controversial strategies pursued by weak state
rulers is patronage politics.
3.2.5 Patronage Politics
Because of the fragmentation of social control, many rulers face threats to their security and are
making immense efforts to buy the loyalty, or at least compliance, of dominant groups in
society. The simplest and most effective way of doing this is to employ state resources and
assets as patronage. This practice, however, creates a blur between the collective and private
interests of rulers. Reno (1998: 3) states the following:
"The triumph of informal ... networks to the near exclusion of state
bureaucracies ... could leave rulers in a condition in which they pursue power
through purely personal means and that pursuit becomes synonymous with
and indistinguishable from their private interests. Rulers thus would jettison
aI/ pretenses of serving the interests of a public that may contain dangerous
rivals or unruly citizens ... This absence of col/ective, versus private, interest
is a major distinguishing feature of warlord politics. "
Consequently, while the practice of patronage politics is effective at building power bases, it
weakens the state's ability to render services to the wider population. Leaders who rule by
means of patronage prefer not to spend money on education and health care, as a critical
population would question the government's intentions. Furthermore, the allocation of scarce
resources to public services may attract the attention of subordinates who may consider
removing the corrupt leader and taking control of these resources themselves. In the event of
the leader being removed from power, and the consequent disintegration of patronage
networks, it is those with the most developed and advanced business contacts from the former
government who are likely to have the best weapons, as those with financial resources and
foreign business connections merely obtain arms faster than their opponents. Followers of
these so-called warlords are usually young men who exploit warfare to enrich themselves, as
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they are often the most marginalised segments in collapsing economies and corrupt states
(Reno, 2001: 3-6; Baker, 1999).
Another form of patronage politics is racketeering, money laundering and organised crime. In
Africa the opportunities for criminal behaviour are multiple, with only a few constraints in place.
This arises as a result of the inadequate development of effective, efficient, fair and equitable
criminal justice systems (Williams and Brooks, 1999: 86-87). Reno (2001: 3-4) observes that
rulers often use control over the state to aid their business associates, grant loyal associates
access to business opportunities such as smuggling or drug trafficking, and trade exemption
from prosecution in exchange for favours. Foreigners wishing to conceal their illegal business
transactions support such leaders, since both are able to use sovereign prerogatives to disguise
their transactions. These arrangements transform patronage politics into trans-national
alliances that generate profits in global markets. This was the case in Liberia, when President
Taylor was accused of concealing illicit transactions of diamond and drugs smuggling from
conflict zones in Angola and Sierra Leone.
Furthermore, many of these rulers' subordinates develop extensive networks in the criminal
business world and these commercial connections are valuable resources for leaders of
insurgencies who literally wish to fight their way into power (Duyvesteyn, 2000). Since the Cold
War, well-armed subordinates in a number of African states have toppled political systems
based on patronage. However, these new self-instated rulers do not exclude patronage clients
in favour of building effective state institutions. Rather, Reno (2001:4) states the following:
"Nearly all the warlords in Somalia, Congo ... and Liberia once held high
positions in governments they later attacked, and had developed important
commercial connections as part of an old patronage network ... These
connections have become valuable raw materials in battles to topple weakened
patrons and to fight off other claimants of state power ... This phenomenon is not
peculiarly African, but it is specific to the collapse of regimes that relied on
clandestine commercial connections and predatory behaviour to survive."
One could thus deduce that African states may not necessarily be more corrupt than others in
other pars of the world. The difference is that in Africa corruption is combined with a form of
rule that is hostile to efficient state institutions and the rule of law. Such misrule often provokes
substantial national criticism (Reno, 2001: 3). In order to combat unacceptable levels of
corruption and mismanagement, reform coups may be initiated, which in turn often lead to
internal conflict.
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This was the case in Sierra Leone where a succession of corrupt governments methodically
excluded the majority of the population from the political and economic arena. Since its
independence from Britain in 1962, Sierra Leonean rulers have struggled to build a nation from
a large number of diverse ethnic groups. Government had to buy the allegiance of various
strongmen whose loyalty was essential for the effective exercise of power. Not wanting
strongmen to utilise state institutions to threaten their own authority, rulers weakened
government bureaucracies and manipulated access to resources in order to undermine possible
rivals. For instance, Siaka Stevens, Head of State from 1967 to 1985, systematically turned
over the country's diamond industry to dubious business associates whom he exempted from
taxation (Reno, 1997b: 228). He also turned over the entire fishing and diamond industry to
Jamil Sahid Mohammed, his Afro-Lebanese business associate. Mohammed attended cabinet
meetings, vetoed ministerial appointments, opposed ministerial decisions and even violated
government foreign exchange regulations. Another example of Stevens' corruption was in the
realm of recruitment into the army and police, not based on merit but on connection. Such
recruits were supposed to ensure regime survival and were conditioned to be violent, if the need
arose, to support the regime (Mcintyre, 2002).
Because of a lack of a strong independent base of personal followers, Joseph Momoh, Stevens'
successor, was unable to end the private control of Sierra Leone's wealth that Stevens' cronies
enjoyed. This loss of official revenue incapacitated most state institutions and rendered Momoh
unable to supply essential state services. In response, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
led by Foday Sankoh, was established, and called for the termination of government patronage
and corruption. In March 1991 the RUF, backed by Liberia's Charles Taylor, launched its
insurgency against the All Peoples Congress government of President Momoh (Abdullah and
Muana, 1998: 178). In response to the invasion, Momoh increased the army's strength from 3
000 to 14 000 troops, but was unable to finance this expansion. As a result, soldiers did not
receive their salaries and on 29 April 1992 they staged a coup, overthrowing Momoh,
establishing 26-year-old Valentine Strasser as his predecessor. Within a comparatively short
period the RUF deteriorated into one of the fiercest and most barbarous rebel armies in the
world, whilst the war claimed over 75 000 lives and forced more than one million people to flee
their homes (Jackson, 2002: 43; Reno, 1997b: 228).
Another strategy followed by weak state rulers is the manipulation of state economic structures
and policies.
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3.2.6 Manipulation of State Economic Structures and Policies
State ownership of enterprises, control of prices, and manipulation of exchange rates and
foreign trade to the benefit of entrenched privileged groups are well known policies utilised by
self-serving state officials. Weak state rulers who lack capable administrations find markets
useful for controlling and disciplining their rivals. They also often contract a wide variety of
economic roles to outsiders, partly to deny internal opponents access to resources and to utilise
outsiders' expertise and connections to accumulate as much wealth as possible. This wealth is
transformed into political resources, purchasing the loyalty of some and acquiring arms to
coerce others (Reno, 1998: 1; Reno, 1997c: 497; Baker, 1999).
Weak state rulers also manipulate economic structural adjustment programmes, whose aim is
actually to eliminate unproductive forms of economic behaviour and rent-seeking corruption and
to curtail the effect of political interests in the economies of states (Cilliers and Cornwell, 1999).
On the surface, the commercialisation of political power is consistent with structural adjustment
programmes and other external reform requirements from creditors who dictate severe
reductions in the size and activities of state agencies. However, behind the scenes, creditor
demands to privatise state agencies and liberalise markets are used as pretexts to hire foreign
firms, including those employing mercenaries. These services are very attractive to politically
vulnerable leaders who need both capital investment to please creditors, and reliable fighters to
battle rivals and control access to resources (Reno, 1997c: 497). This was the case in Angola,
where the government hired Executive Outcomes (EO) to train personnel, recover the territory
captured by UNITA and defend it against further attacks. As remuneration, the mercenaries
were either paid in cash, or - as often happened - were granted mining concessions in mineral
rich areas (Pech, 1999: 83; Kooson, 2000: 11; Clearly, 1999: 147). The Sierra Leonean
government also brought in mercenaries, most notably British military consultants, Sandline
International, as well as EO, in order to assist the government in its efforts to exploit and control
the country's mineral rich resources (Douglas, 1999: 175; Cornwell, 1998: 2). The escalating
incompetence of weak governments to prevent internal violence, induce private military
companies to play an increasingly important role in African conflicts.
It is important to note is that this strategy - the manipulation of state economic structures and
policies - directly negates liberal principles of private markets, since its intention is to prevent
entrepreneurial activity among rivals. However, in order to maintain the pretence of legality, this
market intervention usually occurs through the agency of individual partners or compliant
foreign firms, rather than through formal state institutions. For example, formerly state-
controlled enterprises often fall into the hands of clients and close associates of the ruler.
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These ostensibly private enterprises also enjoy preferential access to credit, which obstructs the
development of a truly autonomous private sector even further (Reno, 1997a: 169; Reno, 1998:
21).
Furthermore, Reno (1997a: 167) observes that rulers develop special relationships with aid
agencies that acknowledge the political and economic alliances betweenweak state rulers and
outsiders. Aid agencies prefer the stability accompanying these relationships to the anarchy
prevalent in states besieged by warfare between local strongmen. Officials prefer to conduct
business with rulers who claim internationally recognised state sovereignty, rather than
attempting to build relations with competing strongmen. This relationship indicates how aid
organisations and creditors, who are supposed to advocate the role of state authority in
international affairs, eventually come to support political systems that increasingly deviate from
conventional notions of state sovereignty. Ironically, this support enables weak state rulers to
reject the risky strategy of authority-building by effective state institutions capable of mobilising
populations, while controlling uniform central authority.
Yet, in order to employ the strategies of patronage politics and the manipulation of economic
structures and policies, weak state rulers need one essential commodity - wealth-creating
resources.
3.2.7 Exploitation of Resources and Creation of War Economies
Without resources and revenue rulers are unable to acquire the loyalty of their collaborators and
purchase arms to coerce their enemies. However, against the background of the lack of
effective state structures and institutions to build a healthy economy, rulers often find
themselves caught up in dire economic crises and are forced to adapt to them. According to
Jackson (2002: 45) this process of adaptation often involves assuming direct military control of
resources and the creation of war economies. This removes the need for efficient state
institutions, since the trading of scarce resources releases governments from the immediate
pressure of collecting taxes from its citizens. Readily available exports income grants rulers the
opportunity to exploit state funds to enrich themselves, their families and their cronies.
Furthermore, in this context of scarce resources, corruption is integral to the political strategies
of rulers, as revenues are used to build strong political networks and patronage to buy the co-
operation of key individuals.
Yet, it is not only rulers who are interested in resources. Strongmen also require them in order
to acquire arms to fight government forces and opposing strongmen. A specific type of
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strongman, who is especially interested in the exploitation of resources, is a warlord. In this
regard, Mackinlay (2000) states that the "combination of failing states, societies in transition,
globalised markets, easy communications, improved transport technology and unprotected
national resources has propagated new plunderers." However, warlords should not be
confused with insurgents who have a long-term political agenda and fight for the political control
of a state. The opposite is true of warlords, since they are not interested in capturing the state
as such. They surface only when the state has become too weak to interfere with their
business transactions (Mackinlay, 2000). According to Allen (1999: 371) they are more
interested in plundering than in military confrontation. They operate by exploiting and
plundering the population by looting and taxation. More importantly, they exploit the natural
resources under their control for their own personal enrichment, for patronage, and to purchase
arms. They achieve this by establishing export trades with external business associates,
including, amongst others, foreign firms and politically connected individuals in other states.
Consequently the motivation for conflict becomes less important than the question whether the
warring parties are able to sustain their war effort financially. In other words, even if the initial
rebellion was motivated by legitimate grievances, such a rebellion can only persist if it is
financially viable (Naidoo,' 2000). Thus in these wars groups compete for control over
resources, which then become the "reward" for controlling the state. This move towards the
formation of entrenched war economies is characteristic of a number of weak states with an
abundance of natural resources such as land, oil and minerals.
The significance of diamonds in subsidising UNITA's war effort over the last decade is well
documented. Profits from diamond sales became increasingly important, especially against the
background of 'the political changes in the post-Cold War era. The diamond fields became the
stage on which the players acted their war-play - a war that cost the lives of at least 500 000
Angolans, with thousands more maimed by landmines. Although diamonds have provided the
majority of UNITA's funding, other resources, such as gold, coffee, wildlife products and timber
were additional sources of funds. By seizing the areas of Lunda Sui and Lunda Norte Provinces
near the DRC border, UNITA carved out a sizeable chunk of the diamond industry (Lewis,
1997). Consequently, between 1992 and 1998, UNITA obtained an estimated minimum
revenue of US$3.72 billion from diamond sales (Global Witness, 2000) and in 2001 between
US$1 million and US$1.2 million worth of diamonds were smuggled out of Angola per day
(Southern Africa Documentation and Cooperation Centre, 2001). This became the foremost
barrier to the peace process. It has allowed UNITA to replenish its munitions and sustain a flow
of supplies. This in turn has enabled it to ignore the 1992 election results and to evade meeting
its responsibilities under the Lusaka Protocol.
47
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Although diamonds play a crucial role in Angola's war, the importance of oil in the MPLA
government's war strategy should not be overlooked. According to Reno (2000c: 219) oil is a
crucial factor in the government's ability to procure access to political and economic networks
outside the borders of the state. These networks do not only include markets, but also
diplomatic and more politically associated commercial networks.
The battle for resources also prolonged the conflict in Sierra Leone where the government
granted its loyal supporters the freedom to loot and the right to inflict violence on the population.
This violence allowed government soldiers of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) to
remain posted in resource-rich areas and to enrich themselves by virtue of the brutal
exploitation of civilians (Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 182). In addition, the RUF embarked on
the illegal mining and exporting of diamonds after capturing the diamond-rich areas of the
Kailuhun and Pujehun districts (Twum-Danso, 2003: 22).
The conflict in the DRC has also been influenced by the battle for resources. In fact, all sides
have been accused of having commercial interests in the war. The extensive resources are
being utilised to finance both warring coalitions, to aid the economies of the external actors in
the conflict, and to produce private wealth for many cronies of the government and opposing
groups. For example, the former President, Laurent Kabila, used money earned from mining to
finance military recruitment, his diplomatic campaign and his political programmes. On the flip
side of the coin, the rebels have also entered into business agreements to finance their
participation in the war. Rebel-controlled territory is rich in minerals such as gold, diamonds
and tin, as well as timber, coffee, tea, beans and maize which are sold ,through companies in
either Uganda or Rwanda. Most of the money so obtained is stashed in Ugandan and
Rwandan banks and used to purchase arms and medicine. Opposition groups also raise war
taxes, for example on cameras, satellite phones and foreign-registered vehicles (International
Crisis Group, 1999: 23).
A notable feature of the DRC's war is the role played by other states. The participation by
Zimbabwe and Namibia indicates distinct undertones of business interests. Zimbabwe's
political and military elite have transformed the conflict into a business goldmine for themselves.
Philip Chiyangwa, head of a Zimbabwean government economic committee stated: "We
Zimbabweans were the first ones to go to Kabila's assistance, so naturally we are hoping to go
into Congo, using the fact that we are Zimbabweans as our trump card, and be big players"
(International Crisis Group, 1999: 22). In an article written by Sigauke (1998), it is stated that
the Zimbabwean government motivated local companies and individuals to take advantage of
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these close relations in order to extent business relations. This is indeed the case. Kabila
invited the Zimbabwean National Defence Force together with the Minerals and Mining
Corporation and the Mining Development Corporation in Zimbabwe, known as Osleg, to join
forces with DRC-based mining companies in extracting Kimberlite diamonds from the Mbuji-
Mayi region of the DRC (Misser, 2000). In addition, he transferred all the activities of
Gecamines, a major state mining company, to two private companies in which he, President
Mugabe from Zimbabwe and President Nujoma from Namibia, had shares. These two
companies formed an alliance to exploit the mineral resources of the central sector of the DRC
(Intemational Crisis Group, 1999: 22). Kabila also granted concessions to Angola to exploit
offshore oil and to Namibia to operate the diamond mine at Tsikapa (Breytenbach, 2002: 7).
This enabled Kabila to channel the profits into his own pockets as well as those of his allies.
In addition, Uganda and Rwanda have also regarded control over the exploitation of Kivu's large
economic potential as a method of organising resources and business in the east of the DRC,
which would decrease their dependence on international donors (International Crisis Group,
1999: 22).
Likewise, private companies (based in Kampala, Kisangani, Goma and Kigali), as well as local
Congolese businessmen, are also cashing in on the war. The private companies deal in
minerals, air cargo transport, weapons and essential commodities, while the expatriate
businessmen use their duty-free status to import goods from the Far East without paying taxes.
Most of them are supporting the rebellion and say they hope the war would continue
(International Crisis Group, 2001: 23).
Considering the quantity of business flowing in and out of the DRC, it may be questioned
whether or not the original ideological concept of the war is still valid. The rebellion, even if it
may originally have had legitimate political claims, gradually became a pretext to plunder natural
resources for the private enrichment of the participants.
In Sierra Leone, soldiers and rebels alike realised that immense profits were to be made
through the illegal mining of diamonds and the looting of civilians. They not only invaded the
alluvial diamond fields of the south, east and northeast, but also the areas of bauxite and rutile
mining (Douglas, 1999: 178). The rebel group initially consisted of a group of 500 soldiers, but
the seizure of the diamond mines quickly allowed them to increase this 500-man army to
20 000, armed with some of the best weapons on the market. They also raided towns and
villages, leaving a trail of death, destruction and severed limbs (CNN, 2000). Similarly, soldiers
of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), who were unhappy with the payment
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of their wages and other benefits, started raiding and plundering, thus becoming very much part
of Sierra Leone's problems.
In addition, the role played by Liberia's Charles Taylor is well documented. He used the RUF
as a proxy to seize economically viable parts of Sierra Leone to purchase arms and payoff his
own supporters. Liberia exports approximately 100 times more diamonds than its internal
resources could ever hope to produce, and Taylor has consequently earned a fortune from his
shares of the profits. Liberia had also been the main supplier of arms to Sierra Leone (Kamara,
2001).
Although the initial objective of Liberia's war was to obtain control over the central government,
the exercise of control over the country's rich natural resources gradually became an objective
in itself. Governments in neighbouring countries, as well as European governments and
companies - specifically from France and Belgium - provided weapons to the different factions
in exchange for gold, diamonds and timber (World Rainforest Movement, 2000). For example,
in the early 1990s the factions sold rubber, timber, iron ore, gold and diamonds through a
network of foreign firms. The income received from these exports peaked at US$100 million
annually. In addition, the factions received maritime registration income from international
shipping to the amount of some US$16 million to US$20 million annually, split between the
various factions (Reno, 1998). Currently, the export of timber is the Liberian government's key
source of revenue. At the current rate of logging the majority of Liberia's forests will be none-
existent within the next 10 years (Hofstatter, 2001).
According to Kaldor (1999) these wars are furthermore spurred by globalisation's destructive
influence on states' political and economic designs.
3.2.8 Globalisation and International Mercantilism
Tshitereke (2003: 84) is of the opinion that these "conflicts reflect the re-emergence of globalised
political economies that are no longer dependent on an inclusive nation-state competence." This
causes the deterioration of central authority, notably over the instruments of legitimate organised
violence. This, in turn, spurs the expansion of various sources of authority and power, for
instance private military companies. This is accompanied by an increase in informal economic
structures, which 'Co-exist with the more formal structures of the economy, and together they
pave the way for the collapse of economic and social security for the majority of the population
(Kaldor, 1999).
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The external intervention of large private companies in weak state wars clearly depicts the
effect of globalisation and international mercantilism. The 1998World Investment Report (1998:
185) states that foreign companies' main objective in the Third World is the extraction of
resources. Belligerents also depend on the private sector's ability to exploit and commercialise
scarce resources (British Ministry of International Development, 2001: 14). Staples (1999: 1)
argues that one should realise that in the developing world, a corporation could function as an
equal to national governments - it is able to apply its immense economic resources to support
and even determine the outcome of civil wars, if political diplomacy fails to fulfil its narrow
interests. In certain cases, a corporation can become a protagonist itself through economic
warfare or by using highly trained and well-armed private armies. This was the case in the DRC
where International Diamond Industries (IDI), an Israeli firm, was awarded an 18-month
monopoly on diamond exports, presumably to provide funds and military assistance for the war
effort (Dietrich, 2001).
Another case in point is the Sudan's civil war where the dynamic influence of the country's rich
oil resources cannot be denied. A Christian Aid report (Christian Aid, 2001) states that
companies from Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada,
Malaysia and China all have interests in oil exploration in the Sudan. In the midst of the
bloodshed, oil corporations are collaborating with the Sudanese government to develop oil
resources, providing money to buy arms and pay soldiers.
Canadian oil corporations and the Sudanese government started working hand in hand in 1997,
when Calgary-based Arakis Energy Corporation began drilling for oil in southern Sudan.
Initially, the government provided 1 000 soldiers to protect the drilling operation against rebel
attacks, but since then, the number of wells has grown and so has the number of soldiers
employed to protect them. Arakis assisted the soldiers by building a hospital, repairing military
vehicles, and providing electricity and water to Sudanese army camps. Not surprisingly, rebel
forces have attacked foreign oil corporations in their war against the government. In October
1998, Talisman Energy Inc bought Arakis. In February 1999, several churches submitted a
proposal, requesting Talisman not to provide material aid to the Sudanese government to be
utilised in the civil war, nor to infringe on internationally accepted standards of human rights.
However, Talisman rejected the proposal. In August 1999, the start of the international trading
of oil from the specially built Beshiar terminal near Port Sudan caused a new wave of anxiety
regarding whether the protagonists were really interested in ending the prolonged conflict
through negotiations. Bolstered by the enormous profits from oil exports, the government has
no incentive for ending the war peacefully. Thus, the oil resources that were supposed to fuel
the social and economic infrastructure of the continent's largest state instead fuelled the
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ongoing civil war and famine, which has already claimed the lives of nearly two million people
and has displaced 4.5 million more (Omondi, 2000: 24; Staples, 1999: 1).
The preceding discussion enables one to identify the various characteristics of conflicts within
weak states.
3.3 CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICTS
Allen (1999: 369) makes the following observation with regard to Africa's wars:
"Looked at broadly, what is implied in the studies of war and violence in the
nineties ... is that violence has become a norm within social and political
behaviour, not an option and a last resort; that violence may now have become
an end in itself, rather an instrumental device; and that violence and warfare
have become self-producing, with no prospect that they can be brought to an
end."
This remark suggests that these wars are different from those associated with the Clausewitzian
school of thought. Kaldor (1999: 2) agrees with this notion and suggests that these conflicts are
a concoction of war (generally defined as conflict between states or structured political
organisations with political objectives), organised crime (violence used by privately established
organisations for private objectives, mainly financial gain) and large-scale human rights
violations (violence employed by governments or politically organised groups against
individuals). Allen (1999: 369) observes that these conflicts usually transpire in the form of
prolonged civil wars, which are resistant to peaceful settlement.
A very disturbing characteristic of these conflicts is the increased application of extreme,
appalling and irrational forms of violence and brutality, which includes torture of women and
children, mutilation, barbarous rituals and the forcible involvement of children, spouses and
relatives in rape and killing. These forms of violence usually target civilians rather than armed
militia and entire groups rather than individuals, as a means of humiliation, revenge and
intimidation (Ero, 2000; United Nations Children's Fund, 1996c).
Another disturbing characteristic, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, is the
widespread use of child soldiers. Children have become one of the main targets of violence
and are being used to perpetuate this. They are deliberately indoctrinated into a culture of
violence and deployed as an instrument of war.
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As mentioned previously, a significant socio-economic characteristic of African wars - which
may be regarded as either a cause or a consequence of conflict - is the prevalence of
widespread poverty and underdevelopment. To fully comprehend the extent of poverty in
African warring states, and how they compare to the rest of world, it would be useful to examine
their per capita income and HOI rankings4. Table 1, which summarises the per capita income of
the various states from 1990 to 1999 and the HOI rankings from 1990 (when the HOI was first
introduced) to 2001, clearly indicates that these states have at least two significant economic
characteristics in common.
Table 1: Per Capita Income and Human Development Rankings during the 1990s (UNOP,
1992: 20; UNDP, 1995: 20; UNDP, 1997: 45; UNDP, 1999: 136-137; UNDP, 2001: 206-207;
UNDP, 2003: 280-281; African Development Bank, 2000: 213; Esterhuysen, 2002: 44-45).
210 140 120 142 165 169 170 160 171
230 110 110 110 127 143 142 141 142 167
120 110 100 100 138 171 170 172 158 169
471 131 159
310 210 230 250 134 156 174 164 152 158
160 140 130 159 173 175 174 162 175
151 166
290 290 330 145 144 158 142 138 138
220 330 310 320 133 158 159 158 141 147
From the above it could firstly be deduced that they are very poor states with declining per
capita income. In 1990, the average per capita income of these states was US$296, which was
well below the US$409 average of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1999, the situation had deteriorated
even further, with the per capita income averaging only US$198 - once again very low in
4 The HOI is a composite index used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNOP) to measure progress in
basic human development by incorporating achievements regarding the most basic human capabilities, namely
longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Three variables have been chosen to represent those dimensions: life
expectancy at birth, educational attainment (i.e. adult literacy rate and combined enrolment ratio) and real income
(i.e. purchasing power). Depending on their HOI values, states are ranked into three groups: high human
development, medium human development and low human development (Esterhuysen, 2002: 24).
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comparison to Sub-SaharanAfrica's average of US$500. It is evident that during this period the
average per capita income was never even close to the cut-off line of one dollar per day.
Secondly, they are all low-ranking in terms of HDI. In fact, all these states, with the exception of
the Sudan (which was ranked medium in 2001) are ranked as low HDI states. Since 1994,
Sierra Leone has had the lowest ranking in the world. All ten the above states were ranked in
the lowest 20 percent of the total number of states over this time period. Although levels of
development were already unfavourable at the beginning of the 1990s, it reached desperate
proportions in 1999 when these states were among the lowest 15 percent of ranked states.
This means that, in general, the per capita income, life expectancy, adult literacy rates and
school enrolment ratios of these states are very low. This translates into very low levels of
development.
Another characteristic, which emanates from poverty, is the uneven access to wealth-creating
resources. According to Breytenbach (2002: 5) this causes polarisation, which creates a
struggle for power and wealth between rulers and rebels. Because the formal economies of
poor states offer restricted money-making prospects, the focus shifts away from the formal and
• legal sectors of the economy to the informal and illegal sectors, where opportunities for wealth-
making are much better. This may explain why the majority of African wars are intra-state,
rather than inter-state, and why the battle for resources has become a characteristic of
numerous poor states.
This also clarifies the creation of war economies, as the chaos and confusion created by conflict
lead to the emergence of a parallel economy that often serves to fuel the war. Tshitereke
(2003: 89) agrees with this notion, stating that ''whereas in the Clausewitzian dissection, war
was seen as the continuation of politics by other means, the contemporary discourse reverses
the equation and war is increasingly becoming the continuation of economics by other means."
Naidoo (2000) confirms this point of view, observing that "current trends and modalities of
protracted conflict reflect transnational economic linkages which are heavily reliant on the
smuggling of a state's natural resources for the supply of military hardware required for
sustaining a war." These war economies are administered by various role players.
Breytenbach (2002: 3) depicts them as a triangle of interdependent forces with three types of
actors, namely rulers of weak states, rebels and mercantilists who profit from the proceeds of
scarce resources.
This introduces another characteristic, namely the increasing prominence of non-state actors.
The parties waging these wars are diverse and include groups such as paramilitary units, local
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warlords, criminal gangs, police forces and also mercenary groups (Kaldor, 1999: 8). The most
prominent of these actors are warlords who operate by exploiting and plundering the resources
and population under their control.
The consequences of these conflicts are multiple and far-reaching. The scale and nature of
warfare have directly affected the lives of many millions of Africans. It exacerbates the
problems associated with poverty. It leads to the collapse of instruments of public order, for
instance the military and police. It destroys the physical public infrastructure, including schools
and hospitals. This leads to diminished access to public services, and hence higher disease
and infant mortality rates and lower school enrolments. It undermines existing safety nets and
coping mechanisms within local communities. It diminishes the population's sense of
citizenship based on shared rights and obligations. It creates competition for resources
between previously cooperating regions, ethnic groups and communities. It creates increasing
numbers of vulnerable people, such as refugees and displaced people, orphans, female and
child headed households, HIV/AIDS victims etc. It leads to the emergence of new groups that
are dependent on war for their livelihoods, but who are also potentially at risk, for instance child
soldiers, demobilised combatants and war wounded. It produces new forms of inequality
associated with the privatisation of violence. It leads to rent-seeking by those with access to
state and military power, and those controlling weapons, transport routes, food distribution,
access to aid, minerals and natural resources.
3.4 SUMMARY
Africa's inter- and intra-states conflicts severely impair all attempts to establish sustainable
stability, prosperity and peace for the continent's people. Poverty is a significant factor in the
occurrence and continuation of these conflicts. They may furthermore be regarded as an
unintentional consequence of weak state rulers' strategies to maintain power, to establish
domination, and to govern political demands. Political centralisation, authoritarianism and
repression, the exclusion of certain ethnic groups from the economic and political spheres, the
manipulation of democratic processes and mechanisms, patronage politics, the manipulation of
state economic structures and policies, the exploitation of resources, and the creation of war
economies are all high-risk strategies, which could lead directly to war. In these cases, the
structural features of weak states (fragmented societies, the dilemma in which state leaders find
themselves, etc.) are the underlying causes of internal conflicts, while the strategies of rulers
are the immediate cause or the trigger of such conflicts (Jackson, 2002: 45; Amoako, 2000: 13).
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However, many of Africa's internal conflicts are the direct result of deliberate strategies
designed to accumulate wealth as weak state rulers and their antagonists recognise the
advantages of war economies. Globalisation have created increasing external demands and
decreasing internal resources in many weak states, and also widened the gap between the
developed and developing regions of the world, intensifying the economic problems of many
weak states. Declining financial resources for both patronage and coercion often force leaders
and their rivals to seize direct military control of resources and populations. These conflicts also
reflect transnational economic linkages, which strongly depend on the exporting and smuggling
of scarce resources for the provision of funds and military hardware required for sustaining the
war. These entrenched war economies are not only administered by political elites who employ
national armies to foster business enterprises for personal financial gain, but also by rebel
movements who seize control of strategic locations with guaranteed economic spin-offs and by
mercantilists who capitalise equally on rulers' and rebels efforts. This leads to an increase in
poverty and underdevelopment, as scarce resources and income are channelled away from the
populace into the ha~ds of the various internal and external role players. This causes conflicts
to escalate, as large sectors of the poor population, including children, start to participate in war
as a means of laying their hands on a share of the financial benefits flowing from war
economies.
These conflicts have serious effects on the communities in which they occur. Besides the
immense loss of lives, people also lose their livelihood: houses, businesses, hospitals and
schools are destroyed; economic conditions deteriorate; illness and disease spread like wild
fires; children do not obtain any proper education; and millions of people are displaced or
become refugees. These circumstances seriously affect children, as they create the ideal
conditions in which child soldiers are recruited and exploited. Chapter 4 will focus on the child
soldier phenomenon and the underlying socio-economic conditions that contribute to the
participation of children in armed conflict.
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CHAPTER4
CHILD SOLDIERING IN AFRICA
4.1 BACKGROUND
Africa's wars - whether caused by fragmented societies, warlords and weak state rulers, or
arising from social, political and economic conditions - have an extremely negative impact on
the continent. Amoako (2000) states the following:
"War is undoubtedly the destroyer of economic development on our continent.
Indeed, the empirical evidence is now overwhelming that armed conflict destroys
capital, leaving shattered infrastructure in its wake; armed conflict, being a
negative shock on economic systems, reduces savings even when the levels of
these savings are most fragile; armed conflict diverls porlfolios away from
domestic investment, and triggers massive capital flight; armed conflict also
distorls foreign aid budgets which now increasingly are devoted to emergencies;
and, most fundamentally, armed conflict massively diverls government
expenditures away from provision of economic services towards military
expenditure."
Although war obviously impacts on all African communities, it is the children who suffer most
during conflict situations. Children and youths are left orphaned, displaced, or become
responsible as the head of the household when parents are killed or away fighting. Schools are
destroyed or closed, fields are off-limits because of combat or mines, and relatives and
neighbours are arbitrarily arrested, abused, tortured or killed. Such youths are at risk for
recruitment or, in their desperation, become receptive to ideological propaganda encouraging
them to enlist, as a gun is often a meal ticket and a more attractive option than sitting at home,
being afraid and helpless (Smit, 2001).
UN Secretary General Koffi Annan noted in his report, "The Causes of Conflict and the
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa" (United Nations, 1998),
that war affects virtually all of the social and economic issues affecting children. Scarce
development resources are diverted to war. Essential health and education services are
paralysed. Entire communities are uprooted and impoverished by the loss of livelihoods,
rendering specifically women and children vulnerable to disease, hunger and sexual
exploitation.
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It should, however, be borne in mind that the involvement of children in conflict is not a recent
phenomenon. Stravrou et a' (2000: 35) and Brett and McCallin (1996), amongst others,
mention that children have actively served their nations or communities as soldiers in armed
conflict since the beginning of time. In the ancient civilisation of the Spartans, boys were taken
from their homes for military training at the age of seven (Stavrou et a', 2000: 35); in Europe in
the Middle Ages, teenage boys were knight's attendants, caring for their armour and performing
other supportive tasks (Brett and McCallin, 1996; United Nations Children's Fund, 1996d); the
children's crusade of 1212 featured 30 000 children of which many were sold into slavery and
many more drowned in the Mediterranean; in the early nineteenth century boys as young as 12
years were soldiers in Napoleon's army; Nelson's navy included many teenage naval cadets
and midshipmen (Honwana, 1999: 4); the twentieth century saw children drafted as soldiers in
both World War I and World War II (Brett and McCallin, 1996); and, more recently, the British
army used youths of 17 on active service in the Gulf war (Honwana, 1999: 4).
However, more recently, as stated in Chapter 1, technological developments and the
proliferation of weapons, especially small arms, have made semi-automatic rifles light enough to
be used and simple enough to be stripped and reassembled by a child of ten. Moreover, these
weapons are not expensive - in some countries at war, an AK47 may be bought for as little as
US$6 (Machel, 1996; Akwei et a', 1999). These developments enable the deployment of child
soldiers on a much larger scale and in more dangerous circumstances than ever before.
4.2 CHILDREN INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICTS
Children do not have the intellectual or physical maturity to be reliable fighters. If this statement
is true, why then, are they recruited as soldiers? Experts are of the opinion that there are two
fundamental reasons for employing under-aged recruits. Firstly, children are easier to recruit
and retain than adults. They can easily be intimidated and exploited, do as they are told, are
less likely to rebel or escape, and do not demand wages. They are also small, speedy, fearless
(specially under the influence of drugs and alcohol) and are able to move around unhindered
without instantly being suspected of spying or supplying. A second reason refers to a shortage
of manpower (Bennett, 1998: 31; Brett, 2000). According to Brett (2000), child recruitment is
rare in the early stages of any conflict, but once the pool of recruits dwindles because of war,
poverty and disease, children provide a convenient last reserve of fresh recruits to fill the ranks.
Since irregular and guerrilla forces cannot conscript members of the general population, they
are the first to resort to the forced recruitment and press-ganging of children. However, Table 1,
which summarises the employment of child soldiers by government forces, paramilitaries and
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rebel groups, clearly indicates that all the armed groups in these wars are to a greater or lesser
extent guilty of recruiting and deploying children. Recruits are arbitrarily seized from the streets,
schools and orphanages. Typically, these children feel abandoned, fearful and horrified. This is
the start of a tyranny of fear and indoctrination intended to undermine the children
psychologically and to make them subservient to their commanders. Efforts to resist are met
with physical abuse, death or severe reprisals against the children's family members. Children
from the poorer areas in the community are particularly vulnerable.
Table 2: The Utilisation of Child Soldiers by Government Forces, Paramilitaries and
Armed Opposition Groups (Masland, 2002: 34; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
2001a)
4.2.1 Recruitment by Non-Governmental Forces
There are numerous examples of forced recruitment by rebel forces on the continent. Angola's
opposition force, UNITA, is notorious for forcibly recruiting and abducting children as young as
10 years old as combatants and sex slaves. Recruits are usually sent to remote military camps
for training. Few constraints exist on what the trainers inside these camps can do to children,
and children themselves lack the internal locus of control, which normally develop through
exposure to positive role models and a healthy family life, to distinguish right from wrong. Once
recruited, they are subjected to varying degrees of indoctrination through processes that use
fear, brutality, and psychological manipulation to achieve high levels of obedience, converting
these children into killers. They are desensitised to violence by being exposed to it. They are
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also often subjected to beatings, humiliation, and acts of sadism. (Africa-Europe Faith and
Justice Network, 2000).
Likewise, in the DRC the MLC and the RCD-ML regularly undertake recruitment missions into
villages, returning with truckloads of children between 13 and 18 years, who receive infantry
and weapons training from UPDF instructors. The RCD-Goma, assisted by Rwanda's RPA,
also undertake massive recruitment campaigns targeting Congolese as well as Rwandan
children and youths. Children are frequently sent into battle without weapons to create a
diversion, resulting in immense casualties (Marshall, 2001, 2001 b; Anon, 2002a).
Another example are the Hutu opposition forces in Burundi - the National Council for the
Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the Party for the
Liberation of the Hutu People-Front for National Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) and the
Umbumwe-Front for National Liberation (FROLlNA) - which are all well-known for recruiting and
abducting children from schools and other public sites within communities. At the start of the
conflict, between 3 000 and 5 000 children under the age of 18 were sent to the Central African
Republic, Rwanda and Tanzania for training. The main recruiting targets are street children,
orphans, children separated from their families and children from very poor families (Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001 b; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 21).
In Rwanda, President Habyarimana provided training to the youths of his party and established
the militia known as the Interahamwe. Many poor young men responded to the President's call
to participate, based on the promise of rewards. Of the approximately 60 percent of Rwandans
under the age of 20, the majority had no hope of obtaining the property or jobs necessary to
support a family. These young men, together with thousands displaced by the war and living in
camps near the capital, provided many of the first recruits to the Interahamwe (Human Rights
Watch, 1999a).
Similarly, the LRA has abducted nearly 10 000 Acholi Ugandan children to serve as soldiers,
porters and sex slaves since 1987. In November 2001, records indicated that there was no
indication of the safety or otherwise of 5 555 children who were still unaccounted for (Machel,
1996: 16; Anon, 2002b). According to Amnesty International (1997) commanders belonging to
the LRA, force children to participate in ritualised killings soon after they are recruited. The
objective is to break down resistance, destroy taboos about killing and implicate children in
criminal acts. Children are also forced to commit atrocities in their own villages, thus preventing
them from ever returning to their homes and families (Wessels, 1997: 34). This is a frequently
used tactic, exposing them progressively to violence, numbing them so that these children could
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someday commit acts of sadism of their own accord, without being instructed to do so.
Psychologically weakened and fearful of their commanders, children can become obedient
killers, willing to take on the most dangerous and horrifying assignments (Fair, 1995).
Ethiopia's armed opposition, the OlF, has forcefully abducted and recruited children already
prior to 1995. It happens from time to time that children join these forces vOWJntarilyas they see
it as the only organisation in Ethiopia that fights for the rights of the Oromo people. The
existence of a battalion of about 100 women and girls has also been reported (Coalition to Stop
the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001b; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 37).
All the factions involved in Somalia's civil strife are also guilty of child recruitment. Although
exact figures of child recruitment and employment are difficult to verify, it is widely believed that
children as young as 10 years have participated in militia attacks. Many young people are
members of the gangs, known as morian, who loot and plunder wherever they go (Child
Soldiers Global Report, 2001; Child Soldiers 1379 Report, 2002: 85).
During Sierra leone's civil war the RUF often rounded up thousands of young people from the
border zone with Liberia and forced them to take part in horrific acts of violence against
members of their own families, and communities (Richards, 1999: 18; Center for Defense
Information, 1998a; loyd, 2001). According to Boothby and Knudsen (2000), an estimated 80
percent of all rebel soldiers were between seven and 14 years of age. Children were also often
forced to take drugs and alcohol. Under the influence of these substances they were inclined to
commit atrocities that they would not commit under normal circumstances (Fofana, 1999).
Former RUF child combatants have admitted that they were forced to drink alcohol and take
drugs, including cocaine, amphetamines (referred to as blue boats), and marijuana. When
children refused to take drugs, they were often beaten, and in some cases even killed (Amnesty
International, 2000c). Komba, a boy captured by the RUF, recounts the following: "My legs
were cut with blades and cocaine was rubbed into the wounds. Afterwards I felt like a big
person. I saw the other people like chickens and rats. I wanted to kill them." 14-year-old Alieu
tells: 'We smoked jambaa [marijuana] all the time. They told us it would ward off disease in the
bush. Before a battle, they would make a shallow cut here [on the temple, beside his right eye]
and put powder in, and cover it with a plaster. Afterward I did not see anything having any
value. I didn't see any human being having any value" (Masland, 2002: 33).
In Liberia, the opposition group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (lURD) also
recruit children, often in retum for food from their families (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, 2001). According to Mcintyre and Thusi (2003: 79) there are unconfirmed allegations
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that some former child soldiers from Sierra Leone are fighting alongside the LURO rebels in
Liberia.
Although rebel groups are the main culprits in exploiting children, government forces are not
without guilt.
4.2.2 Recruitment by Government Forces
Whenever governments on the continent are desperate to replenish their fighting forces, they
too yield to the above temptation (Bennett, 1998: 31). When investigating the legal age of
recruitment in the African states where child soldiering is most severe, one finds the following:
the minimum age for recruitment laid down by a government is 16 years (Burundi); in Angola
and the Sudan the legal age is 17 years and in Sierra Leone it is 17,5; Ethiopia, Liberia,
Rwanda and Uganda all state that no children under 18 years may be recruited; and the ORC
and Somalia have no legal limitations on child recruitment (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, 2001). In reality, these legal limitations are transgressed at will and government
forces often forcefully conscript under-aged children. For example, when administrative
systems are inadequate and conscription is not done systematically on the basis of a register,
lawful conscription could easily degenerate into lawless press-ganging. Machel (1996: 16)
\
reports that birth registration and identity records are inadequate or non-existent in many
countries and children do not know their own age. This means that recruiters have to guess
their ages based on physical appearance and development and often illegally enter the age of
recruits as 18 in order to give the impression that they are complying with national laws.
Once again, examples abound to confirm the recruitment of children by government forces. In
Angola, the recruitment of children by government forces has occurred throughout the country,
particularly targeting poor communities, unemployed young men and internally displaced
persons. According to a report by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2002: 17) to
the UN Security Council, military commanders payoff police officers to supply new recruits. In
2001, an estimated 3 000 children were among the ranks of the FAA. Angolan government
forces also allegedly recruit Angolan refugees in Namibia as well as large numbers of Namibian
youths, some as young as 14years of age.
Likewise, in 1996-97 in neighbouring ORC, the AOFL, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila,
recruited and deployed more than 10 000 children in its rebellion against former President
Mobutu (Gumende, 1999). After 1997, some of the children who were recruited prior to the
regime change continued to serve in the government FAC. Towards the end of 1998, the
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government urged young people between the ages of 12 and 20 to enrol in the armed forces in
response to an anti-government insurgence, resulting in 6 000 young people being sent for
military training. In 2001 children as young as 10 years of age were allowed to enlist, despite
President Kabila's decree to reduce the government's use of child soldiers (Coalition to Stop the
Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 30).
In Burundi, the tendency repeats itself in that government forces have recruited a substantial
number of children under 18 years of age since the beginning of the civil war. Despite the
government's stated policy of over-18 recruitment, a lack of birth registration and trafficking of
identity documents makes the recruitment of minors difficult to control. Government forces use
hundreds of doriay (ear agents), some as young as 12 years, to collect and provide information,
to participate in looting, to serve as watchmen, scouts and porters, and to perform domestic
tasks in exchange for food. The government also recruits children for local defence forces,
known as gardiens de la paix (guardians of the peace) (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, 2002: 20).
In 1994 the Rwandan Ministry of Defence agreed to demobilise all child soldiers. At that stage
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) hosted an estimated 5 000 children under 18 years.
Although the Rwandan government recently claimed that government forces no longer employ
child soldiers, sources indicate that the RPA still recruit children on a regular basis. These
children include both Rwandans and Congolese who are trained by the Rwandan armed forces
and sent to the DRC as reinforcements. The Rwandan government dismisses these claims
(Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001).
Although Uganda's legal recruitment age is 18, the government admits that during the war in the
1980s, the Museveni-Ied National Resistance Army deployed large numbers of child soldiers.
However, the government claims that the utilisation of these children was dictated by
circumstances and that the children were never engaged in serious battles. Lately, the UPDF
has recruited under-18s in northern Uganda to fight the LRA in Southern Sudan. The UPDF
has also provided military support to opposition groups in north-eastern DRC by training and
equipping young recruits (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 96).
Between 1993 and 1996 the Sudanese government resolved to institute forced recruitment, as
too few men were recruited during regular conscription. These recruits included children as
young as 12 years of age. In addition, paramilitaries and armed groups siding with the
Sudanese government also have a history of forced recruitment and abduction of children as
young as 10 years. These groups include the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and the Baggara
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tribes of the Western Sudan who are armed by the Sudanese government. In March 2002 it
was reported that government and allied paramilitary forces continued their previous practice to
abduct women and children during attacks on villages in southern Sudan (Amnesty
International, 2000d; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 93).
In Ethiopia, thousands of children were recruited into the government forces during the border
conflict with Eritrea (Amnesty International, 200b). Recruitment focused mainly on children from
the Oromos and Somali ethnic groups, as these groups traditionally form the main opposition to
the government. Peasant and urban-dwellers associations were given recruitment quotas and
mainly targeted unemployed youths and street children. Children were also press-ganged from
villages, schools and marketplaces. They would, for example, surround a marketplace, order
every male to sit down and then force anyone deemed recruitabie into a truck. Teenagers who
worked in the streets selling cigarettes and sweets were particularly at risk (Wessels, 1997: 34).
Since there is no proper system of birth registration in Ethiopia, it is difficult to verify the age of
children, leaving minors at a high risk of recruitment (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
2002: 36).
During Sierra Leone's civil war the government-allied forces consisted of a loose coalition
between the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The government
came to rely heavily on the CDF, which included various groups of traditional hunters, in
particular the kamajors, who were well known for recruiting children, including some previously
demobilised child combatants. For instance, in 2000, 25 to 30 percent of the SLNCDF forces in
the town of Masiaka consisted of children between seven and 14 years of age. Recruitment
also took place in the Bo, Kemema and Moyamba Districts of the Southern Province (Coalition
to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001; Farley, 2001).
During the course of Liberia's seven-year civil war child soldiers were recruited by the AFL and
pro-government militia groups that consisted mainly of former NPFL combatants, many of whom
were also recruited as children. Boys were sent to the Small Boy Units where they were
conditioned to rape, torture and kill. They were also given drugs, notably marijuana,
amphetamines and a cocktail of gunpowder and cane juice. However, the end of the war did
not bring relief to the children. The continued instability in the country meant that Liberian
security forces continued with the forced conscription of children as young as 14 years
(Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2002: 58).
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4.2.3 Voluntary Participation
A large number of young soldiers are not forced or coerced into participating in conflict, but
present themselves for service. However, it would be misleading to consider this as voluntary,
as voluntary participation is often a response to pressure of a more subtle nature (Shiraz, 2001).
Children sometimes feel compelled to take up arms for their own protection. Alone, orphaned
and frightened, they may often finally choose to fight. Some children believe that they are safer
inside armed movements than outside, and that being attached to a military force is the best
chance of surviving a situation of violence and social chaos. Boothby and Knudsen (2000: 60)
quote a boy from the ORC saying: "I joined Kabila's army when I was 13 because my home had
been looted and my parents were gone. As I was then on my own, I decided to become a
soldier."
There are also children who have grown up with violence - since many current disputes have
lasted a generation or more - and see this as a permanent way of life. In Uganda in the late
1990s, some abducted girls who became pregnant were taken to special camps in the Sudan
and cared for by older LRA female commanders until they gave birth. The children then
became the next generation of LRA fighters (Mazurana and McKay, 2001: 3). Being exposed to
nothing other than war and fighting, it is almost impossible for these children to assume any
other role than that of a soldier.
According to Bennett (1998: 32), the sheer fun and adventure of wearing military gear and
carrying an AK47 around attracts a significant number of children. This should be understood
against the child's personal circumstances as refugee, street child or orphan. In these
circumstances fighting is certainly the preferable option. Similarly, children may also be lured
by the power they have when they carry arms.
Children also have active reasons for fighting. They may see themselves fighting for social
justice, religious beliefs, nationalistic and political ideology, or cultural identity. Wessels (1997:
32) reports that in the 1990s in Rwanda, the Hutu-dominated government transmitted messages
of hate towards the Tutsis, thus preparing children for their roles as killers in the youth militias in
the 1994 genocide. However, Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994: 35) are of the opinion that young
children do not have sufficient cognitive capacity to think rationally regarding concepts, such as
ideology and nationality, and suggest that these children are indoctrinated into fighting for these
causes. Machel (1996: 17) states that children are particularly impressionable in early
adolescence when their personal identities are being developed.
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Children may also have more personal reasons for taking up arms. Many child soldiers have
personally experienced or witnessed rape, torture, massacres, disappearances, summary
executions, death squad killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, bombings, forced displacement
and destruction of home and property (Sesay et aI, 2000: 48; Machel, 1996: 16). These
experiences often create a desire for revenge or the resolve to continue the struggles of lost
loved ones. In Uganda in 1985 the National Resistance Army child soldiers were described as
"highly motivated, reliable and dedicated, often instilled with a strong sense of revenge triggered
by the UNLA [Uganda National Liberation Army] atrocities against their families, friends or
village" (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994: 32).
4.2.4 Children as Soldiers
Children perform a variety of tasks, including a whole range of military activities, increasing their
exposure to hardship and violence. The younger ones usually start as porters, carrying food
and ammunition. Although this may seem completely innocent, it entails carrying very heavy
loads of up to 60 kilograms, including carrying injured soldiers. Children who are too weak to
carry their loads are often savagely beaten or killed. A report from the Human Rights Watch
(Human Rights Watch, 1997) states that in Uganda, the LRA tie children up and force them to
carry looted goods. They receive very little food and are frequently beaten for no reason. Weak
with hunger, sore from constant beatings and infected feet, many of the children struggle to
keep up with the group, and are consequently killed by their captors. Those children who try to
escape face barbaric repercussions. The rebels force new recruits to beat or stab these
unsuccessful escapees to death, thus initiating them into the gruesome ways of the LRA
(Dunson, 2002).
Children are also used as messengers and spies. One rebel commander stated that children
are good spies, because they are young, small and inconspicuous, and nobody suspects them
of spying (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001a). In guerrilla warfare this is
important, as children are a significant link to the civilian population, whose overall support for
the cause of the insurrection is vital. In Uganda in 1986, the National Resistance Army sent
children into the capital to locate the government fortifications. When the bombing started, the
children mingled with the fleeing crowds and hurled grenades at trucks carrying government
soldiers (United Nations Children's Fund, 1996). While this may seem less life-threatening than
hand to hand combat, it is in fact more dangerous, as it puts all children under suspicion. In a
military sweep in Congo-Brazzaville, all the rebels who had attained the "age of bearing arms"
were killed, including the children (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001a).
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When children are not actively engaged in combat, they perform a variety of household duties,
such as cooking, attending to the wounded, washing clothes, working in the gardens, hunting
for wild fruit and vegetables, and looting food from gardens and granaries (Machel, 1996: 18).
They are also often tasked to man checkpoints. Adult soldiers usually stand a few metres
behind the barrier so that when shooting breaks out, it is the children who are the first victims
(Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001 a).
As soon as they are strong enough to handle an assault rifle, normally at 10 years of age,
children are used in combat. Because they are easily exploited and manipulated, they are
often given the most dangerous assignments, including mine sweeps, suicide missions,
shielding commanders on the battlefield, and extracting valuables from the deceased while
under sniper fire. They are usually the first line of defence, drawing heavy fire and clearing the
path for the regular forces (Human Rights Watch, 1997).
During raids in towns and villages, children are also ordered to loot, kill, amputate and mutilate.
Abbas Fofanah, a 16-year-old Sierra Leonean, recollected the following when talking to
Newsweek (Masland, 2002: 34):
"When we caught kamajors we would mutilate them by parts and display them
in the streets. When vil/agers refused to clear out of an area we would strip
them naked and burn them to death. Sometimes we used plastic and
sometimes a tire ... I saw a pregnant women spilt open to see what the
baby's sex was ... In Kabala I was forced to do amputations ... If you have a
large number of amputated hands in the bag, the promotion wil/ be automatic,
to various ranks ... We gang-raped women, sometimes six people at a time. I
didn't feel much because I was drugged ... I remember one tough operation.
We kil/ed people, we cooked them, we ate them and then we broke their
pots."
Children are not only exploited for combat purposes - they are also victims of sexual abuse.
Young abducted girls are treated as commodities to be traded and are often given as wives to
commanders. In Sierra Leone and Uganda, the status of a male commander is directly
proportional to the number of abducted girls he is given as wives (Wessels,1997: 32).
The risks of these girls contracting sexually transmitted diseases or unwanted pregnancies are
enormous. HIV, syphilis, gonorrhoea, infection, uterine deformation, vaginal sores, menstrual
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
68
complications, premature births, stillbirths, sterility, and death are some of the fates they suffer.
Ordinary problems associated with pregnancy are also intensified by their affiliation to fighting
forces. In Sierra Leone the RUF's delivery customs included jumping on the stomachs of
pregnant girls and inserting objects into their vaginas to force the girls into labour, or tying their
legs together to delay birth if the forces needed to move quickly. Babies often die because their
mothers do not have access to proper health care during and after pregnancy - they are
ignorant with regard to aspects of breast-feeding and infant care, and in conflict situations,
malnourished, tired and untrained new mothers find it difficult to nourish and sustain their babies
(Wessels, 1997: 32).
The previous discussion enables one to identify certain socia-economic factors that would
render a state and society prone to the exploitation of child soldiers. These characteristics
could be categorised as: high levels of poverty and hunger; poor medical and health conditions;
poor educational systems and low literacy levels; and large numbers of refugees and uprooted
people.
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
The motivation for becoming a soldier is found in the political, social and economic conditions
directing the child's life. At present, it is disturbingly difficult to find African children who are not
confronted with some form of dire social, political, cultural, or economic pressure (Mcintyre,
2003: 94). Brett and McCaliin (1996: 1) describe child soldiers as follows:
"Regardless of how they end up in armed forces, child soldiers share a
remarkably similar profile. They come from poor and otherwise
disadvantaged sectors of society. They are children of conflict zones. They
are children whose families have been disrupted or lost entirely... They are
mostly children without the protection of wealth, influence or adults. They are
virtually defenceless against forcible recruitment and may actually welcome
the protection which group membership offers. They are often children
struggling to survive. The armed group represents a source of food and
shelter. They are children for whom the culture of war is part of their daily
lives."
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4.3.1 Poverty and Famine
An investigation into the socia-economic situation in states using child soldiers reveals that.
conditions are desperate. As indicated in Chapter 3, poverty is endemic. The number of
Burundians living below the poverty line has doubled to 60 percent since 1993. In some parts
of the eastern DRC, people are subsisting on the equivalent of US$0.18 per day, while 2.5
million people in Kinshasa live on less than US$1 per day (Worldwide Refugee Information,
2001). Estimates of 1995/96 show that 45.5 percent of Ethiopia's population were living below
the poverty line. (Government of Ethiopia, 2000: 4; Rose & AI-samarrai, 2001: 37). In Rwanda,
65 percent of the population are living below the poverty line, and in Sierra Leone the estimates
are as high as 75 percent (Government of Rwanda, 2000: 3; Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep,
2000). In 1996/97 Somalia's GNP per capita was between US$176 and US$200 (United
Nations Development Programme, 1999). In 1999, 80 percent of the displaced population in
the Sudan's capital, Khartoum, were very poor and spent four-fifths of their income on food
purchases that met only half of their nutritional needs (Anon, 2001 b).
This is a stark picture, and it is getting even darker. Famine is widespread in these countries
and magnifies the problems caused by war and poverty. Some 200 000 people in Kuito, in
Angola's highlands, including 40 000 severely malnourished children, are entirely dependent on
food aid (Ramsay, 2001: 41). According to Stokes et al (2000: 2093), malnutrition rates have
increased and exceed the 5 percent alert threshold by far. Conflict and displacement in Burundi
has killed 20 percent of the country's livestock, and crop production declined by 33 percent
during 2000 (Worldwide Refugee Information, 2001). 16 million people in the DRC have critical
food needs, and severe malnutrition among children under five has reached 30 percent in some
areas (Global Issues, 2001b; Edgerton, 2001). In Sierra Leone, the minimum wage of those
who have retained their jobs meets only 36 percent of staple food bills, and 80 percent of
households, mostly headed by women, are unable to provide appropriate care for their children
(Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, 2000). At the end of 2000, an estimated 750000 Somalis
suffered from food shortages. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported that Somalis
lacked one-third of the daily food intake normally needed and that 40 percent of the population
in rural areas and sites for internally displaced people were malnourished (Worldwide Refugee
Information, 2001). In August 2000, an estimated 2.4 million Sudanese needed food aid, and
25 percent of the residents in Upper Nile Province were suffering from malnutrition (Anon,
2001b). In 1999/2000, acute food shortages and lack of water as result of drought, were
affecting significant areas of the northern and western parts of Uganda (Uganda Ministry of
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2001).
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4.3.2 Health Conditions
Despite Africa making considerable improvements in the provision of health care, about 50
percent of all Africans nevertheless lack basic health care (Mulinge, 2002). Poor medical and
health conditions pose an increased threat to the already poor and malnourished populations of
the African continent. There are numerous examples of these deteriorating services. In the
Angolan city of Kuito, one of the areas worst hit by the war, government provides only 1.2
percent of the central hospital's requirements (Anon, 2001a: 44). In Burundi, life expectancy
has fallen from 53 years to 42, and infant mortality has increased by 17 percent since 1993
(Worldwide Refugee Information, 2001). In the DRC, at least 37 percent of the population -
approximately 18.5 million people - have no access to any kind of formal health care and there
is only one doctor for every 14 000 persons (Esterhuysen, 1998: 138; Global Issues 2001 b).
Only 51 percent of the Ethiopian population has any access to health services. Many health
centres in Rwanda cover more than 30 000 inhabitants, and in certain districts large
percentages of the population live more than one-and-a-half hours walk from these centres
(Government of Rwanda, 2000: 34-35). At the end of 2000, virtually no health structures in
Sierra Leone functioned outside government-controlled areas (Worldwide Refugee Information,
2001). It is estimated that only 10 to 30 percent of the population have access to adequate
health services, and life expectancy for men and women is 39 years and 36 years respectively
(Radio Netherlands Wereldomproep, 2000). In Somalia, a shattered national health system
could not ward off high levels of tuberculosis, malaria, and gastrointestinal and other endemic
diseases, particularly among children and women (United Nations Development Programme,
1999). Only a handful of hospitals and health clinics are functional in southern Sudan
(Worldwide Refugee Information, 2001). In Uganda only 43 percent of the districts have any
type of health facility and only 40 percent of the units have achieved a minimum staffing norm
(Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2001).
HIV/AIDS has also left its legacy. More people have died of HIV/AIDS in 2000 than in all the
wars on the continent in the past (Global Issues, 2001a). At the end of 1999, 360 000 adults
and children were infected with the virus in Burundi and 230 000 children have lost mothers or
both parents to the disease (while they were under the age of 15) (Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2000: 3). In the DRC, between 800 000 and 900 000 children have
been orphaned by HIV/AIDS (Global Issues 2001b). At the end of 1999, the preponderance of
HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia was estimated at as high as 10.6 percent of the adult population. About
90 percent of these reported HIV/AIDS cases comprise adults between the ages of 20 and 49
(Government of Ethiopia, 2000: 20). A similar scenario is evident in Rwanda and Uganda
(Jelinek, 2000).
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4.3.3 Education
Although tremendous progress has been made in making access to basic education available to
the general population, Africa's educational systems are often poorly developed and illiteracy is
widespread. Years of war have taken its toll on both the educational systems and the
educational infrastructures of countries. According to Mcintyre (2003: 94) educational
opportunities in Africa are limited and often non-existent. In Angola, many of the rural schools
have closed down and the numbers of learners in secondary schools are low even by African
standards (Esterhuysen, 1998: 79; Clover, 2002). In Burundi, nearly 400 schools (about 25
percent of the total schools in the country) have been demolished and school attendance has
fallen by nearly 30 percent (Worldwide Refugee Information, 2001). In the ORC, four out of ten
children do not attend school and 400 000 displaced children have no access to education
(Global Issues, 200b). Less than 50 percent of Ethiopian children have access to primary
schooling (Government of Ethiopia, 2000: 4; Rose and AI-samarrai, 2001: 36). In Somalia, only
about a quarter of the adult population are literate (Esterhuysen, 1998: 309). This is also the
pattern throughout Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and Uganda.
4.3.4 Refugees and Displaced People
As to refugees, Africa is sheltering more than 13 million people uprooted by years of war,
repression and civil unrest. It is estimated that close to a quarter of Angola's 13 million citizens
have been internally displaced (Hawthorne, 2001: 28), whilst an estimated 600 000 Burundians
were internally displaced by the end of 2000 (Worldwide Refugee Information, 2001). Prevailing
war and human rights abuses forced up to one million Congolese to flee their homes during the
course of 2000, bringing the total estimated number of uprooted persons to 2.1 million after two
years of war (Global Issues, 2001 b). More than 200 000 Rwandans were uprooted at the end of
2000 and between 1.4 and 2 million Sierra Leoneans were displaced at the end of 2000 -
nearly half the country's total population. In Somalia, factional conflict, drought and floods
displaced an estimated 20 000 people from their homes during 2000, adding to the nearly
700 000 Somalis uprooted in previous years. The conflict in the Sudan has left more than 4
million people uprooted - the largest internally displaced population in the world (Worldwide
Refugee Information, 2001). Similar numbers are reported in Ethiopia and Uganda.
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4.3.5 Effects on Children
What effect do these conditions have on children? The groups most affected by poverty and
hunger are the unemployedand unskilled youths, as well as households headed by women and
children. These are also the most vulnerable groups being targeted for recruitment into armed
forces. Young boys working in the informal sector, selling cigarettes or sweets are often
abducted without anyone missing them or enquiring about their whereabouts. Poor children
may volunteer for service if they see this as a stepping-stone towards bidding farewell to
poverty, because of the prospects of acquiring looted property. They may also perceive it as
the only way to ensure regular meals, clothing and medical attention - thus, mere bread and
butter reasons (Machel, 1996; Sesay et el, 2000). In Liberia in 1990, children as young as
seven were fighting because they believed "those with guns could eat" (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill,
1994: 33). When survival is the major motivation, child combatants are unlikely to abandon
their arms until they are certain that their basic needs are beingmet.
In addition, poverty and hunger often urge parents to offer their children for military service,
especially when armies pay a minor soldier's wage directly to the family. In some cases parents
even encourage their daughters to become soldiers if their marriage prospects are poor.
Children from wealthier families are therefore at less risk of being recruited. They are often left
undisturbed or are released if their parents pay a release fee. Some parents even send their
children abroad to avoid the possibility of forced conscription (Machel, 1996). Well aware of
these factors, recruiters target the areas where poor and unattached children gather - streets,
marketplaces and townships.
Poor medical and health conditions also have far-reaching consequences for already
vulnerable, poor, and defenceless children. Adult war victims often do not receive the
necessary medical attention, and are consequently unable to return to the front line. This leads
to the reduction of fighting forces and necessitates military commanders to exploit other
reserves of human resources - children. The situation is aggravated when these war victims
succumb from their wounds, leaving thousands of children orphaned. These children are
homeless and defenceless and become easy prey for abduction and recruitment by military
forces. Once they have been captured, they have a limited chance of being traced, of having
someone to argue their rights, of proving their age or even bringing political influence to bear
(Amnesty International, 2000a).
Since HIV/AIDS is the main cause of death among people aged 20 to 45 years, it is fast
changing the demographic structure of Africa's population and severely reduces the pool of
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potential adult military recruits. Once again, in the face of this dilemma, military forces will
resort to the only source of manpower remaining - children. As increasing numbers of adults
succumb to the disease, leaving thousands of orphans behind, it becomes even easier for
armed forces to entice children into their ranks. These children are in desperate situations and
see the armed forces as surrogate families and the commanders as parents.
Another tragic consequence of HIV/AIDS is the rejection of so-called "witch children" who are
blamed for bringing evil forces into the family. Many such children end up on the streets, and
joining a military group is their only route to possible survival (Morris, 2000: 211).
Education also plays a vital role in a child's development. In her report on the impact of armed
conflict on children, Graca Machel (1996) states the following:
"Education is particularly important at times of armed conflict. While all
around may be in chaos, schooling can represent a state of normalcy.
School children have the chance to be with friends and enjoy their support
and encouragement. They benefit from regular contacts with teachers who
can monitor their physical and psychological health. Teachers can also help
children to develop new skills and knowledge necessary for survival and
coping, including mine awareness, negotiation and problem solving and
information about HIV/AIDS and other health issues. Formal education also
benefits the community as a whole. The ability to carry on schooling in the
midst of difficult circumstances demonstrates confidence in the future:
communities that still have a school feel they have something durable and
worthy of protection."
Primary schooling is essential in the development of children and the formation of social
networks. It enables children to explore their surrounding environment in a controlled situation.
It gives shape and structure to their lives and could instil community values, promote justice and
respect for human rights, and enhance peace, stability and interdependence (United Nations
Children's Fund, 1996b).
In conflict-ridden African states, the reality is in stark contrast with the above ideal condition.
Most children do not have the opportunity to complete their primary schooling. This restricts the
development of their identity and self-esteem, as well as the development of peer relationships,
and renders them even more vulnerable for recruitment into armed forces. Where educational
opportunities do exist, children are restrained from attending school. Parents are reluctant to
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send their children to school, because of a lack of financial resources; they may need their
children to work in order to contribute to the family economy; some fear that their children would
be abducted on their way to or from school, and others are illiterate and do not comprehend the
importance of education.
These children do not know their basic rights. They are at risk of recruitment or, through their
innocence, may become receptive to ideological propaganda encouraging them to enlist. This
sets a vicious cycle in motion. The further child soldiers fall behind their peers attending school
and belonging to family structures, the more difficult it becomes to catch up, and consequently
the easier it is to return to fighting. These children would develop no basic life skills nor receive
vocational training and would be condemned to a life of fighting - not by choice, but out of
desperation.
Furthermore, refugee camps are also fertile sources of large numbers of highly vulnerable and
defenceless children, especially when these camps are located near borders or conflict areas.
Circumstances in these camps are usually deplorable, and create the ideal environment for
armed groups to abduct children without the knowledge of their parents or relatives. Orphans
are even easier prey, as they are highly susceptible to any suggestion of "belonging".
Refugee children are also at high risk of volunteering to become combatants, as joining an
armed group sometimes appears as the better alternative to their present circumstances. The
restrictions of life in a refugee camp could make an armed group appear very attractive to a
restless child, and the promise of a sustained livelihood is a powerful lure in camps where
poverty and hunger are overwhelming. Children are especially vulnerable when they are
separated from their family members, and are easily transformed into fearsome and
uncompromising soldiers.
4.4 SUMMARY
Although child soldiering is not a new phenomenon, it has never been as widespread and as
serious as is currently the case in African states. Although children are not an obvious source
of military manpower, they nevertheless become the only source of military manpower when the
supply of adult recruits dwindles. They are easily abducted or recruited and transformed into
little killing machines. Government forces and rebels alike are guilty of forceful recruitment and
abduction of children. Government forces in African states include, amongst others, the FAA in
Angola, the FAC in the ORC, the RPA in Rwanda, the UPOF in Uganda, the SLA in Sierra
Leone and the AFL in Liberia. Rebel forces include UNITA in Angola, the MLC, RCO-ML and
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RCD-Goma in the DRC, the CNDD-FDD, PALIPEHUTU-FNl and FROLINA in Burundi, the lRA
in Uganda, the OlF in Ethiopia, all the factions involved in Somalia's civil strife, the RUF in
Sierra leone and the lURD in Liberia. The nature of these children's participation in war
ranges from support roles, to active combat. They are exposed to atrocities, such as mass
murder, torture and sexual abuse, and under the influence of drugs and alcohol they are often
the perpetrators of such brutality, sometimes against their own family members.
The socio-economic conditions in states using child soldiers create an excellent breeding
ground for children to be abducted or to volunteer as soldiers. Poverty is endemic; famine is
widespread; medical and health conditions are deplorable; schools are closed or burnt down;
and thousands of people are displaced. Having been exposed to such deplorable conditions,
children are easily lured into taking up arms, believing that this is the only way to guarantee
regular meals, clothing and medical attention. Many children also take up arms as a kind of
safety net - faced with violence and chaos all around, they feel safer when armed. Refugees
and uprooted children are also at high risk, especially when they are separated from their family
members, receiving no food or basic care.
From the above discussion it is clear that certain factors which urge children to succumb to child
soldiering are more closely related to the weak state phenomenon than others. For instance,
there is a very strong correlation between the weak state phenomenon and poverty and famine,
the collapse of educational and medical facilities, and large numbers of refugees and displaced
persons. On the other hand, the correlation between the weak state phenomenon and various
other factors is not as strong. These factors include the urge to seek revenge, the fun and
adventure associated with wearing military gear and carrying arms, and the conviction to fight
for social justice, religious beliefs, nationalistic and political ideology and cultural identity.
The contents of this chapter induces one to agree with Afua Twum-Danso (2003: 12) that "this
deadly cocktail of violence, poverty and large numbers of disaffected youth does not bode well
for the welfare and development of children, their communities, nations and the future."
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CHAPTER5
CONCLUSION
5.1 BACKGROUND
At the end of the Cold War there was a great deal of optimism about a new era of peace that
would end the economic and social hardships of war and that would usher in an era of reduced
military budgets and greater resources to invest in social programmes, such as the
advancement of the cause of children. Instead, the opposite became reality, especially in
Africa. The world was plunged into a decade of ethnic and civil wars characterised by
deliberate violence against children on a vast scale. Indeed, it is quite possible that more
children have suffered as a result of armed conflicts and violence during this period than at any
other comparable period in history.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989) grants children rights
relating to their civil, political, economic and cultural lives. The Convention affords children the
following rights: freedom from violence, abuse, hazardous employment, exploitation, abduction
and sale; freedom from hunger and protection from diseases; access to free compulsory
primary education; adequate health care; the right to know and be cared for by both parents; the
right not to be separated from one's family; the right to registration, a name and a nationality
from birth; the right to an identity and to preserve such an identity; equal treatment regardless of
gender, race or cultural background; the right to express opinions and freedom of thought in
matters affecting them; and safe access to leisure, play, culture and art. However, the
deplorable circumstances in Africa's conflict ridden states deprive children of virtually every
single one of these basic rights.
The Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara
Otunnu (United Nations, 2000), is of the opinion that a three-way approach is needed to stem
the present massive use of children as soldiers. Firstly, the age limit of recruitment and
participation in armed conflict should be raised from 15 to 18. Secondly, international actors
should pressurise armed groups exploiting child soldiers. Thirdly, the political, social and
economic factors, which create an environment where children are impelled by some appeal of
ideology or by socio-economic collapse to become child soldiers, should be identified and
addressed. This thesis focused on the third aspect of Mr Otunnu's plea.
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To the present day, governments, NGOs, policy makers and aid workers have tried to resolve
the problem of child soldiering by attempting to prevent armed forces by means of various legal
processes from recruiting children. Efforts were also made to demobilise and reintegrate these
children into their communities. Such courses of action obviously only address the symptoms
and not the causes of the problem. Hence a study of the characteristics of African states
inclined to child soldiering is essential.
5.2 AIM AND MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study was to analyse the circumstances under which children are utilised as
soldiers in Africa. This aim was divided into three subdivisions, namely to describe the type of
states using children as soldiers, to analyse the conflicts in which child soldiers are utilised, and
to describe the socia-economic conditions that impel children to take up arms.
An analysis of the child-soldier phenomenon suggests that it transpires in states exhibiting quite
distinct characteristics. Accordingly, the study found the "weak state" theory applicable to its
focus. The first characteristic of this type of state is that it experiences serious legitimacy
challenges, manifesting themselves, amongst other things, in unstable politics, the
centralisation of power in a ruling elite, low levels of national support for government, high levels
of political disengagement by large segments of the population, and severe social divisions
along ethnic and religious lines. This gives rise to another characteristic, namely the absence of
one cohesive national identity, which is characterised by a tendency of citizens to associate with
ethnic, racial and religious groups rather than with the state. The problems are furthermore
exacerbated by the presence of local strongmen who oppose rulers and their efforts to mobilise
the population and resources under their control. These states also exhibit high levels of
institutional weakness, resulting in an inability from government's side to successfully implement
policies, mobilise civil society, and monopolise the modes of legitimate organised violence.
Formal economic structures are underdeveloped and operate parallel to very efficient informal
markets, involving illegal business transactions and the exploitation of scarce resources, which
render invaluable revenue to ruling elites and their protagonists. Furthermore, these states are
vulnerable to external international forces and actors and its borders are open to arms
smuggling and refugee movements. The last characteristic of specific importance in this study
that is evident in these states, relates to the extensive exploitation of children as soldiers.
Logic then begs the question: what are the underlying causes leading to these states being
labeled as weak? The study adopted Migdal's theory of weak states and fragmented social
control as a reaction to this question. Migdal is of the opinion that its social structures and the
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manner in which social control is distributed influence the abilities and nature of contemporary
African states. In states where control is fragmented amongst various social organisations,
rulers face immense challenges in establishing and enforcing effective policies. These social
organisations and the social control they exert are the result of two sets of interconnected
forces. The first was the historical expansion of the world economy from Europe, especially the
taxation and transportation policies instituted at the time, which opened the way for European
market penetration and rendered established survival strategies obsolete. Consequently, new
patterns of social control started to surface, causing the various societies to act in different
ways.
The second set of forces was the establishment of Western political domination by means of the
structures of colonialism. Colonial rulers were in need of cheap, effective social control, which
forced them to buy off local strongmen with tangible and intangible resources. As a web-like
society with diverse poles of social power was more advantageous to the colonial objective of
stability and security, the colonial powers distributed the resources amongst a selection of
carefully considered local strongmen, consequently dividing the area and preventing the
creation of a bond of local solidarity. Hence the colonialists significantly influenced the
emerging configurations of social control, as they granted only a selected few of the local
strongmen the opportunity to establish social control amongst fragments of society.
After independence, this fragmentation of social control was both a blessing and a curse to
newly instated state leaders. On the down side, fragmentation posed immense challenges to
these leaders, since they could secure only limited public support in the states they governed.
The only way they could win this support was through the effective rendering of state services.
This in turn called for a set of strong state agencies. Thus leaders had to have strong state
agencies in place to induce political mobilisation and support in the relevant fragmented
societies. On the other hand, the leaders also needed the support of the population so that
those same strong state agencies would not threaten their political survival. This was state
leaders' dilemma. As a result, they could follow one of two courses of action. They could either
run the risk and proceed with institution building - whilst employing the politics of survival to
prevent leading officials in important agencies from using their own capabilities against the
central state leadership - or they could choose to diminish the immediate threat by relinquishing
major institution building entirely.
However, state leaders' problems did not end here. They were also threatened by large social
organisations outside of formal state institutions, which had a larger scope than that of
indigenous strongmen. This challenge was managed by means of three different strategies,
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namely the application of "dirty tricks", the incorporation of these organisations into state
institutions, and the strategy of "accommodating capital".
On the upside, the same fragmentation of social control that prevented state leaders from
developing the state's mobilisational capabilities, also created a measure of stability by
restricting the creation of common social identities comprehensive enough to develop into
strong social organisations that could challenge state leaders' rule.
Thus state leaders' inability to manage the fragmentation of social control forced them to adopt
very distinct political policies, which prevented the creation of strong, effective state institutions
with the ability to mobilise the population and present new strategies of survival. In other words,
it limited the accumulation of central state power, i.e. the process of state-making. As this
process involves taxation, policing and the waging of war, the concentration of power in the
hands of the agents of the state is of utmost importance.
Accordingly, the process of state-making was an unfamiliar notion to newly instated state
leaders. Colonialism transferred the foreign concept of statehood to the continent without
introducing the concept of nationhood as complementary to the state. It forced an artificial
pattern of territoriality and sovereignty on Africans without any consideration for their speciflc
political and institutional development. In addition, for some considerable period colonial
powers excluded Africans from the political sphere and delayed the establishment of institutions
of democratic politics until shortly before independence. Consequently, many states became
independent without understanding the mechanisms of modern politics and state-building. As a
result, independence only entailed the replacement of colonial rulers by local rulers, without any
fundamental change in the character of the colonial state.
However, thanks to political events in the international arena, specifically the Cold War, state
leaders could forego major state-building, without sacrificing their political tenure. Superpower
patronage enabled them to bribe political opponents and to purchase weapons to suppress
domestic opposition by local strongmen. The end of the Cold War and the consequent loss of
international aid, however, implied the demise of these old forms of politics. This transformed
weak state politics into a continuous cycle of crisis management.
Because of these events, state-making in many African states is presently still in its infant
stages. Yet, the international state system and institutions do no accept the current state of
affairs and are employing various mechanisms to pressurise weak state rulers to accelerate the
process of state-making. Consequently, state leaders are compelled to embark on massive
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state-building ventures, while managing internal threats from strong state institutions and local
strongmen. In response to the above, leaders have adopted a number of social, political and
economic strategies, which often hold significant risk of civil violence within these weak states.
These strategies, together with the socio-economic conditions inside weak states, create the
ideal circumstances for the incidence and continuation of war.
Poverty is a reliable predictor of conflict. It exacerbates underlying tensions in communities and
states, and deprives governments of the means and the will to end conflict, as these tensions
offer immense economic opportunities to all the warring parties. This sets the stage for weak
state rulers to employ their survival strategies.
The first grouping of strategies entails exclusive politics, political centralisation and
authoritarianism. It is achieved through violence and intimidation, the suppression of effective
political participation, and the concentration of power, and particularly scarce resources, in the
hands of a minority part of the population, with the objective of depoliticising the already
fragmented society. As the state and its mechanisms symbolise wealth, a struggle for control of
the state ensues. This was the case in Liberia, where the fragmentation of social control and
the subsequent rise of political centralisation and authoritarianism led to a brutal civil war.
Closely related to the strategy of exclusive politics is ethnic politics. It could be traced to the
colonial powers' practice of deliberately supporting some ethnic and religious groups at the
expense of others. In the same vein weak state leaders often attempt to mobilise the population
through appeals to ethnicity in order to establish the domination of their own ethnic groups.
This creates continuing cycles of rebellion and repression, as the high premium placed on
political power produces a zero-sum ethnic struggle for dominance. This was the case with the
Banyamulenge in the DRC, the Hutus and the Tutusis in Rwanda, and the Christians in the
Sudan.
Weak state rulers also manipulate democratic processes and mechanisms in order to counter
fragmented social control. This is achieved through the subtle, and sometimes open, creation
of phoney opposition parties, the manipulation of election results, and the intimidation of the
population. Democracy may also be used as a mechanism of suppressing minority ethnic
groups, as was the case in the Sudan.
One of the most controversial survival strategies of weak state rulers is to utilise state resources
and assets to buy the loyalty, or at least the compliance, of dominant groups in society. This
often creates a blur between the collective and private interest of leaders. As a consequence,
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they cease to render basic services to the wider population, as they no longer need to mobilise
support for their cause. This engenders the deterioration of already weak state institutions,
including the criminal justice system, which leads to other forms of patronage politics, such as
racketeering, money laundering and organised crime. These arrangements transform
patronage politics into trans-national alliances that generate profits in global markets. In order
to counter these unacceptable levels of mismanagement and corruption, rebellions may be
initiated, bringing about internal strife. However, these rebellions are more often than not only a
smoke screen for warlords' and rebel leaders' attempts to seize control of the assets and
resources of the state. A case in point is Sierra Leone where a succession of corrupt
governments systematically excluded the population from the political and economic arena.
This led to the creation of the RUF, which deteriorated into one of the fiercest and barbarous
rebel armies in the world.
Self-serving state officials also manipulate state economic structures and policies. They
monopolise enterprises, control prices and manipulate exchange rates and foreign trade in an
attempt to accumulate wealth and to control and discipline rivals. In addition, creditor demands
to privatise state agencies and liberalise markets are used to justify the outsourcing of a wide
variety of economic roles to foreign firms. In reality these practices directly negate the liberal
principles of private markets, since their intention is to prevent entrepreneurial activity among
rivals. Rulers also develop special relationships with aid agencies that prefer to do business
with rulers who claim internationally recognised state sovereignty, rather than attempting to
build relations with competing local strongmen. This empowers weak state rulers to reject the
risky strategy of authority building through effective state institutions capable of mobilising
populations.
However, in order to employ all these economic strategies, rulers of weak states need one
essential commodity - wealth-creating resources. The lack of effective state structures and
institutions to build a healthy economy, leads them frequently to seize military control of scarce
natural resources such as land, oil and minerals. Income received through the trading of these
resources grant rulers the opportunity to build strong political networks, to buy the co-operation
of key individuals, to fend off potential protagonists, and to enrich themselves, their families and
their associates.
Yet, it is not only rulers who are interested in resources. Warlords and local strongmen also
require resources to purchase arms to fight government forces and rival strongmen. As they
often dispose of very limited financial resources, they also resort to the illegal exploitation of
scarce resources. This leads to the formation of entrenched war economies. In the end then,
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these wars, even if they initially have legitimate political claims, become a pretext to plunder
natural resources for private enrichment.
The involvement of other states in these conflicts is significant, since it also indicates distinct
undertones of business interests. This is case in the DRC, where the political and military elites
of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Uganda and Rwanda have transformed the conflict into a
business goldmine. This type of interventionism was also evident in Sierra Leone where the
role played by Liberia's Charles Taylor may not be ignored.
Globalisation also contributes to the continuation of war, as it causes the deterioration of central
authority, especially over the instruments of legitimate organised violence. This is the case
when war economies attract external intervention from large private companies whose main
objective is the extraction of resources. These international mercantilists are in a position to
apply their immense economic resources to support and even determine the outcome of civil
wars. They could even become protagonists through economic warfare and by using highly
trained and well-armed private armies at their behest.
These conflicts - whether caused by poverty, political centralisation, authoritarianism, ethnic
politics, the manipulation of democratic processes and mechanisms, patronage politics, the
manipulation of state economic structures and policies, the struggle for scarce resources, the
creation of war economies, or globalisation - all have very distinct characteristics. They occur
in states where poverty and underdevelopment are widespread and where access to wealth-
creating resources is uneven.
Furthermore, these wars are a deadly cocktail of war, organised crime and large-scale human
rights violations. They involve the application of extreme, appalling and irrational forms of
violence and brutality, targeting large groups of civilians. The protagonists include both states
and non-state actors, such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces
and mercenary groups.
Another characteristic is the widespread use of child soldiers. Although the involvement of
children in armed conflict is not a novel phenomenon, recent technological developments and
the proliferation of small arms have made it possible for them to be exploited on a much larger
scale and in more dangerous circumstances than ever before. Although children do not have
the intellectual or physical maturity to make reliable fighters, they are easier to recruit and retain
than adults. In times of prolonged warfare, illness and poverty, they are often the last reserve of
able-bodied recruits.
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All the armed groups in Africa's wars, including government armed forces, paramilitary groups
and armed opposition groups, are to a greater or lesser extent guilty of recruiting, forcefully
conscripting, press-ganging and deploying child soldiers. Children are arbitrarily seized from
streets, schools and orphanages and are subjected to varying degrees of indoctrination through
processes that use fear, brutality and psychological manipulation to convert them into killers.
Efforts by children to resist are severely punished with physical assault, retaliation against the
children's family members and ultimately death. Children are also forced to commit atrocities in
their own villages, effectively preventing them from ever returning to their homes and families.
A large number of children also present themselves for service. Some may be urged to take up
arms for their own protection. Others have grown up with violence and regard it as a permanent
way of life. There are also those who are attracted by the prospect of fun and adventure and
others who have active or personal reasons for fighting.
Children perform a variety of military-related and household tasks. They are used as porters,
messengers, guards and spies. They also cook, attend to the wounded, do washing and work
in the gardens. As soon as they are strong enough to handle an assault rifle, they are used in
combat to loot, kill, amputate and mutilate. In addition, they are used as sex slaves.
States using child soldiers all exhibit similar socio-economic characteristics. Poverty is
endemic. Famine is widespread and magnifies the problems caused by war and poverty even
further. The provision of medical and health care is insufficient because of the vast number of
war wounded and the destruction of hospitals and clinics. This is aggravated by the high
numbers of HIV/AIDS sufferers. Schools are destroyed, educational systems are often poorly
developed and illiteracy is widespread. In addition, due to years of war and civil unrest, millions
of people are displaced and forced to become refugees.
These socio-economic characteristics create the ideal breeding ground for the recruitment of
child soldiers. Recruiters usually target areas where poor and unattached children congregate,
such as streets, marketplaces and townships. Poor children also often volunteer for service,
since they perceive it as the only way to ensure regular meals, clothing and medical attention.
Furthermore, the shortage of proper medical and health services leads to an increase in war
casualties and HIV/AIDS related deaths. This causes a reduction in the number of fighting force
members and the consequent escalation of child recruitment. It also causes an increase in the
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number of homeless and defenceless war-orphans who become easy prey for abduction and
recruitment.
Education plays a critical role in times of conflict. The lack of proper educational systems and
infrastructure restricts the development of children's cognitive thinking, their identity and self-
esteem, as well as the development of peer relationships. Illiterate children are vulnerable for
recruitment, since they are not aware or informed of their basic rights and are often receptive to
ideological propaganda.
Refugee children are also easy prey for recruiters. The circumstances in refugee camps create
the ideal conditions for children to be abducted without the knowledge of their relatives. These
children also often volunteer for service, as the prospects of a sustained livelihood are a
powerful lure in refugee camps where poverty and hunger are overwhelming.
5.3 SUCCESS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
It was the assumption of this thesis that there is a correlation between the inherent
characteristics of certain African states and their use of chile soldiers. In order to establish the
accuracy of this assumption, the study drew comparisons between the different states that
utilise child soldiers. It identified the characteristics of these states and described what these
entailed in terms of the exploitation of child soldiers. Accordingly the study accepted the "weak
state" theory, which indicates that conflicts are exacerbated by a particular form of politics,
which is in turn embedded in the structures of weak states and the actions of weak state rulers.
The study indicated that the practice of child soldiering is an important characteristic of these
conflicts. In addition, the prevalence of unfavourable socia-economic conditions within these
states urges children to become soldiers. Thus the above assumption is valid, since there is
indeed a correlation between the characteristics of these African states and the use of child
soldiers.
One should, however, note that comparisons were drawn between a comparatively large
number of states. This implies that the individual characteristics of the various states may have
been scaled down in order to highlight the similarities. Hence it would be erroneous to assume
summarily that the characteristics identified in the study are the only characteristics of these
states or that the similarities would be totally comparable in terms of the degree to which they
are present in the various states. Accordingly - as a separate exercise - it may be advisable to
examine the various states, or even regions, separately in order to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of their specific characteristics.
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The most significant weakness of this study is the absence of primary fieldwork. Although the
available research and data were comprehensively studied and incorporated, fieldwork would
have added enormously to the insight of the researcher and the validity and accuracy of the
study. Yet, because of practical constraints, this was not a feasible option.
5.4 RELEVANCEOF THE THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
The theoretical concepts defined and used in the study were meaningful and relevant.
However, there are some minor discrepancies that should be mentioned. Although the concept
weak state was used as a general term to describe a very specific type of state in Africa, it
should be noted that it is not totally applicable to all the states. For instance, it would be more
appropriate to describe Somalia as a failed state. In addition, all the states do not experience
the same level of weakness. However, to distinguish between weak states and weaker states
would have been beyond the scope of this study and would in any event not have made a
significant difference to the aim and main findings. Furthermore, although Migdal's theory that
weak states are caused by fragmented social control is regarded as a highly applicable
explanation for this phenomenon, it is not necessarily the only explanation. Hence, if the scope
of the study allowed it, it would have been useful to explore other theories and explanations.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the weak state-theory has profound implications for conflict
resolution and more specifically for the ending of the utilisation of child soldiers. It is a useful
analytical tool that assists in organising and understanding the literature on internal conflict, as
well as child soldiering.
The manner in which the concept conflict was defined and used in this study was relevant, since
it referred to all the various types of warfare, including conventional warfare, low-intensity
guerrilla-style warfare, factional warfare, genocide and ethnically based conflict.
The concept child soldier, as defined in this study, is generally regarded as the acceptable term
when referring to children who participate in conflict, whether in support roles or active combat.
However, one should note that, although it is a widely accepted term, it may nevertheless be
incorrect. When one analyses the various definitions of the term soldier (as was done in
Chapter 1), one finds that child soldiers seldom comply with the criteria. Accordingly, it may be
more accurate to refer to these children as fighters or combatants.
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5.4 LESSONS LEARNT
"In conclusion, one may reflect on the issue of 'child soldiers' based on two main
factors. The first is the underlying cause of conflict, as opposed to the impact and
end result of the conflict. There is little point in pouring resources and effort into
damage control when the cause of the problem itself continues unabated, as is the
current approach. The second is to address both the social and the economic
issues that face these families and communities in the struggle for survival, and in
their attempts to integrate abducted children back into society. Addressing only
one side of the same coin will result in partial solutions that are inherently flawed.
While those involved in the counselling programmers] are to be commended, the
complete absence of preventive measures is to be lamented" (Stavrou et aI, 2000:
63).
This study did not revolve around finding solutions, but rather sought a better comprehension of
the problem of weak states that create conflicts and the deplorable socia-economic conditions
within which children become soldiers.
This study indicated that no single event or entity is solely to blame for the problems challenging
weak states. The widespread practice of political bribery, corruption, and the establishment of
patron-client networks, could all be attributed to a number of contributing factors. These factors
include the following: the influence of colonialism; Cold War patronage and globalisation; a
breakdown in normal politics; the rise to power of corrupt leaders; the absence of effective
institutions to check the abuse of power and ensure administrative accountability; and most
importantly, class action necessitated by the weak financial standing of the ruling elites. The
latter factor generally assists in unifying the ruling class to focus their efforts on the state; it
prohibits the political organisation of the subordinate classes by emphasising their ethnicity and
isolation; it aids in the extraction and accumulation of resources and capital, as control of the
political apparatus guarantees control over production; and the ruling elite is able to build a
strong political base while manipulating the allocation of resources. In addition, international
financial institutions and aid organisations are contributing to the problem through their
demands for liberalisation and their relationships with weak state rulers.
Thus it becomes clear that the only way to overcome these challenges is to re-establish
legitimacy and to reconstruct the control of organised violence by local, national and global
public authorities. This entails political as well as legal processes, and includes the rebuilding of
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trust in, and support for, public authorities, and the re-establishment of the rule of law within
which public authorities can operate.
Furthermore, preventing armed forces and rebel groups from exploiting children, requires much
more than the ratification of international protocols and conventions, the passing of supportive
laws and policies, and the political will to implement them. What is required is a comprehensive
approach, which acknowledges the political and socio-economic dilemmas discussed in this
study and which deals with them systematically and above all efficiently. African governments
need to build effective state institutions, strive to alleviate poverty, create employment
opportunities, end economically crippling practices, socially and economically provide for AIDS
orphans, and end civil wars. Most importantly, one has to agree with Mcintyre (2003: 99) that
governments and international organisations have to realise that children are not merely a
"special interest group" but in reality constitute the majority of the African people. Only then
would these organisations and governments be in a position to create enabling environments
for the implementation of the laws and policies that have been put in place and could make a
impact on children's rights.
In conclusion, the wisdom of Dostoyevsky (1880: 291):
"Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making
men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential
and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature .,. and to find that edifice
on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect of those conditions?
Tell me, and tell the truth."
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